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GENERAL  BACKGROUND 
·1~  This  Illustrative Nuclear  Programme,  presented pursuant  to Article 40 
of  the  Euratom  Treaty,<1> is the third to  be  published  by  the  Commission. 
Its predecessor dates  back  to 1972.  Between  the  two  there have  been  two 
severe oil crises,  each  followed  by  deep  uncertainty about  the outlook 
for  energy  in the  Community. 
2.  Since  the  nuclear  industry was  still at an  initial stage of development 
in the early 1970s,  emphasis  was  laid  in  the  last  illustrative programme 
on  the  need  to set  up  rapidly  a  nuclear  industry  infrastructure  capable 
of  supporting  increasing use  of nuclear energy. 
3.  Today  there  is a  different  problem. The- European  nuclear  industry ·cav·ers 
all essential aspects of nuclear  power-plant  construction and  fuel-
cycle services.  Hence  the task is now  to  ensure  the full  utilisation 
and  further  expansion of this industrial  capacity with  a  view  to 
(1) 
• • • I ••• 
Article 40:  "In order to stimulate action by persons  and  urdertakings ard to 
facilitate coordinated developnent  of their investment  in  the nuclear 
field, the  Carrnissioo  shall periodically p..bl ish iLlustrative prog-
rammes  indicatirg in particular nuclear energy proc:iJction  targets 
and all types  of investment  f'e(JJi reel  for  thei r atta  il'lllE!f'lt. 
~  (;Qrrmission  shall obtain the q:>inioo of the  Econanic  and Social 
Carrnittee oo  such  programnes  before  their publication/' 
:  ! 
··i  . 
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increasing. the  security of  the  Community's  energy  supply  under  the 
best possible  conditions.  The  question must,  however,  be  viewed  against 
the  background  of  a  changed  situation and  a  new  energy  outlook.  During 
the decade  following  the oil -shock  of  1973,  major  changes  took  place  in 
the macroeconomic  situation and  in the  structure of  the  Community  in-
dustry,  as  well  as  in the  pattern of  energy  demand  and  the  effici~ncy 
"th  h'  h  .  d  .  th  C  .  .  (1)  Th  h  d  th  .  w1  w 1  c  energy  1  s  use  1  n  e  ommum ty.  .  ese  c  ar;t~es  an  .  e1 r 
implications for  the  future  form  a  new  framework  for  the  development  of 
the  nuclear  industry  in  the  yea~s to  ~ome. 
4.  During  the  period  since  the oil shock,  the  Commission  vigorously 
prom6ted  the development  of  nuclear  energy  as  part of  the  Community's 
energy strategy.  In  this:conn~ction it suffices  to  re6all,  in addition 
to the  extensive  R&D  programmes  decided  and  impl~mented, the  energy 
policy objectives  for  1985  and  1990,  approved  in  1975  and  1980 
respectively,  and  the  Council  Resolutions  of  1980  on  fast  breeder 
react6rs,  nuclear  waste  management  and  the  reprocessing  of  ~pent.fuel~(~) 
5.  At  the 6ns•t of  the  1980s,  wh~n ~aking stock of  the  ''nuclear  aspects of 
the  energy  strategy",  the  Commission  noted  that  the  use  of  nuclear energy 
' 
continued  to  be  a  fundamental  option  for  the  Community.  They  expressed 
this point  of  view  to  th~ Council  in  a  communication  of  February  1982 
and,  after  revie~ing all aspects  of  the  nuclear  industry, the  Commission 
set out  the  measures  that it intended to take  in  respect  of  each  of 
them. 
6.  In July 1982,  the-Council  expressed its opinion on  that  communication 
and  stated,  in  ~articu(a~(3 ): 
-~·'··· 
(1) 
lhese  char-9es  were  analysed' in detail by  the  Carmission  in t1110  COIIJIUlications  to 
the COJncil:  CQ\1(84)  87 m:88 final of 29  February  1984. 
(2)  .  • 
OJ  No  C 153,  9.7~1975; OJ  Nt  C 149,  18.6.198);  OJ  No  C 51,  29.2.19&1. 
(3) 
8552/F/82  (Presse 109),  13.?  .1982. - III -
"The  Council  agrees  with  the  Commission's  analysis of the  role of 
nuclear energy  in  the  Community's  overall  energy  strategy,  on  the 
understanding  that  it is  for each  Member  State  to  make  its own 
decisions on  this matter at national  level." 
''The  Council  acknowledges  that  the  development  of electricity production 
from  nuclear  resources  has  economic  advantages  and  is aware  of  the 
advantages  to  be  gained  therefcom  by  industrial operators  through 
having  access  to  competitive  sources  of  energy." 
"The  Council  notes  the :Commission's  analysis  of  the  respective  roles 
of  economic  operators and  national  and  Community  authorities  in  the 
nuclear  field.  In  this  connection,  it stresses that  the  realisation of 
nuclear  energy  programmes  on  the  necessary  industrial  scale firstly 
requires States  to  make  a  clear political  choice  on  the  objectives 
and  means  to  be  used;  the  Community  provides  a  framework  within whJch 
these States  can  find  ~seful  references  and  a  grouping .whose  solidarity 
can  be. an  effective ·instrument." 
7.  It was  in  the  same  communication  that  the  Commission  announced  its 
intention to  resume  publication of the  Illustrative Nuclear  Programmes. 
8.  PINC~ is a  document  in which  the  Commission  describes  and  analyses  the 
situation of  the  nuclear  indsutry and  sets out  the prospects  for its 
medium- and  longer-term development.  It  is  a  frame  in which  to appreciate 
the  cohesive  nuclear policy initiatives which  have  been  taken,  especially 
decisions  on  investments  in nuclear  installations  (particularly those 
referred to  in Article  41  of  the  Euratom  Treaty)  and  within  which  the 
Community's  financial  instruments  can  be  brought  into operation • 
• • • I  D  •• 
*  Acronym derived  from  ''Prograrrme  Indicatif N.Jcleaire  PQJr  La  Ccmrunaute"  Illustrative 
N.Jclear  Prograrrme  for  the Carm..nity. ·" 
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PINC  is  also  intended  to  be  a  ~eference and  guideline  document: 
a  reference  for  those.  who  wish  to.· know  and  understand  the  facts 
about  the  nuclear  industry within the  Community; 
•  a  guideline for  those  who,  in  the  Member  States, are  more  directly 
involved  in  the  economic  development  of  the  nuclear  indUstry  and 
who  will  find  in  the·document  the  position of  the  Commission  with 
regard  to that  development~ 
Its periodic  publication at appropriate  intervals will  enable  the 
requisite  continuity of action to be  ensured  in  the  course  of  time, 
account  being  taken of  developments  in  the  overall  economic  context. 
Since  the  frequency  of publication depends  on  the  rapidity  with  which 
these developments  occur,  it is  conceivable,  for  example,  that  a .report 
on  the  execution of  PINC  '84 will  be  published  in  two  years'  time,  to 
be  followed,  two  years  Later,  by  the  publication of a  new  PINC. 
9.  The  main  thrust of  PINC  hinges  on  two  fundamental  aspects  of  nuclear 
energy and  points  to a  certain number  of  implications  for  the operators 
and,  from  a  political  standpoint,  the  Member  States.' 
The  first aspect  is the  nuclear objective  for  1995  in  relation to  the 
perspective  of  the  year  2000.  For  the  Community  as  a  whole,  PINC 
estimates that  the  contribution of  nuclear  energy  in 1995  will  be  about 
40%  of electricity production  and,  beyond  that date,  it  fore~ees an 
appreciable  growth  in that  contribution,  reaching  SO%  around  the  turn 
of  the  century.  This  ene~gy objective would  imply  that  the  Member  States 
will  have  taken  firm decisions· by  1987,  at  the  Latest,  with  a  view 
to  creating  and  placing  in service  a  nuclear  capacity of  at  least 
25  GWe  between  1991  and  1995. 
The  second  asp~ct relates  to the  more  distant  future.  According  to  PINC, 
long-term security of energy  supplies,  in particular electricity 
generation which  will  be~based to  a  large  extent  on  nuclear  power, 
presupposes  that  the  Com~unity's industry,  in twenty  years'  time,  will 
be  able  to  provide  the electricity producers  ~ith fast-reactor  power-
stations  capable  of economic  performances  comparable  to those of  the 
light-water-reactor power-stations at  that  time  (2005). 
• • • I ••..  · 
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The  implications  toncern: 
·-the r8le of  the public authorities. and  the. electricity-producers; 
-uranium supplies; 
- the  nuclear fuel  industry;  and 
- the  nuclear power-station construction  industry.· 
These  implications  are dealt  with  in the  final  chapter of  PINC. ....  1  -
· A.  INTRODUCTION 
1.  It is a  basic task of  the  European  Atomic  Energy  Community  (Euratom> 
to  "contribute to  the  raising of  the  standard of  living  in the  Member 
States,  •••  by  creating  the  conditions  necessary  for  the  speedy  establish~ 
ment  and  growth  of nuclear  industrjes"  (Article 1  of  the  Euratom 
Treaty>. 
2.  The  development  of nuclear  energy,  therefore,js aimed  at  contributing 
to  economic  growth  and  i~dustrial and  technological  developement.  The 
role of the  Comm~nity as  such,  and  of  the  Commission  in particular,  is 
to establish and  maintain  an  effective  framework  for  cooperation on 
nuclea~ energy  matters  and  to propose  new  measures  where  necessary. 
3.  In  the  case  of nuclear  energy,  a  sophisticated  technology,  it is 
extremely  important  to  have  available  a  clear and  specific  referenc~ 
framew6rk.  A nu~lear power-station  can  take a  decade  to plan  and  con-
struct.  Once  constructed,  it must  be  operated  in total. safety for  30 
years or more.  The  operator must  be  confident  that  fuel  and  fuel 
services will  be  forthcoming  during  that  period  ~~d:that:it will  be 
possible to deal  with  spent  fuel  and  nuclear wastes  satisfactorily. 
4.  All  this  requires  clear political  commitments  to  pr~vide for  continuity 
of  industrial  achievement  and  maximum  utilisation of  technological 
skills. The  experience  acquired  in  the  Community  shows  that, if these 
conditions  are  present,  investments  in  nuclear  en~rgy bring  returns 
which  make  it possible  to  mobilise  the  conside~able financial  resources 
required. 
5.  This  PINC  first of all points out  the  role of nuclear  energy  in the 
economy  of  the  Community.  The  Annex  ''Review  of  and  prospects  for  the 
development  of nuclear  energy  in  the  Community"  describes  the 
evolution of  that  sector. since  1973~  PINC  then  presents  the  Commission's 
views  as  to the  share ofinuclear energy  in meeting  the  Community's 
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electricity  requirements  up  to  the  end  of  the  century and,  finally, 
proposes  specific objectives  for  1995,  the  target date  considered 
by  the  Commission  in ·defining  the  Community's  new  general  energy 
objectives. 
6.  The  Programme  also deals  with  the  continuous  development  and  application 
of advanced  nuclear-energy  production technologies,and,  with  the aim 
of  preparing  in  good  time  for  the  longer-term future of that  sector, 
defines  a  specific objective  for  the  purpose  of  bringing  about  the 
economic  maturity  of  fast  breeder  reactors. 
7.  The  Commission,  however,  is fully aware  of  the  fact  that  the  develop-
ment  of  nuclear  energy  in  the  Community  also  depend~among others, 
on  two.factors  which  determine  the  public acceptance of  the  nuclear 
industry: 
i)  the  safety and  health  protection  a~hieved in  nuclear 
instal Lations; 
ii)  the  existence of  safeguards  on  the  use  of nuclear  materials. 
8.  The  Commission  is paying  careful attention to  both  of  these factors, 
which  were  dealt .with  in detail  in a  general  communication  to the 
Council  on  9  February  1982: 
"An  energy  strategy for  the  Community:  the  nuclear aspects" 
(COM(82)  36  final). 
9.  In  addition,  these factors  were  subsequently  the  subject  of  two 
specific  Commission  communications: 
"The  Community's  role  as  regards  the  safety of  nuclear  installations 
and  the  protection of public  health"  <COM<83)  472  final  of  22  July  1983); 
"Report  from  the  Commission  to the  Council  on  the  implementation of  the 
verification agreements  concluded  by  Euratom  and  its Member  States with 
the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency"  (COM(83)  36  final  of 
27  January 1983). 
·' 
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The  specific  case  of safe  nuclear-fuel  transport  was  dealt.with ln a 
communication  from  the  Commission  to the  European  Parliament  and  the 
Council: 
"The  transportof radioactive materials  in  the  European  Community" 
CCOMC84)  233  final of  26_April  1984>. 
Finally,  the  Community's  research  and  development  programmes  relating 
to  nuclear fission  energy  ~re chiefly concerned  with  the  safety of 
nuclear installations and  ~ealth pr6tection and  with  safeguards on 
the  use  of materials. 
It is f6r  this  reason  ~hat these  topics are not  reviewed  further  in 
'·  the  PINC. 
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B.  THE  ROLE  OF  NUCLEAR  ENERGY  IN  TI.~  ECONOMY  OF  THE  COMMUNITY 
1o  Present  share  of  nuclear  energy  in  the  energy  mix 
10.  From  1973  to  1984,  the nuclear  contribution towards  meeting  the  Community's 
total demand  for  energy  increased  from  Less  than  2%  to  over  10%.  Nuclear 
energy's  share  of electricity production  now  exceeds  25%.  Furthermore, 
the  Community's  nuclear  power  capacity accounts  for  about  one  third of 
world  capacity~ These  figures  speak  for  themselves  and  show  that  nuclear 
power  has  become  an  essential part of  the  European  energy  strategy. 
11.  On  the  basis  of  the  investment  programmes  that are  being  implemented  at 
present  (Late  1984>,  it may  reasonably  be  estimated that,  in 1990,  the 
capacity of  the  nuclear  power  stations in service  - close to  100  GWe  net 
will  cover  about  35%  of electricity production  in the  Community  and  meet 
about  14%  of  the  Community's  overall  demand  for  energy.  This  will  make 
is possible  to easily attain the  objective set  by  the  Community  in 
'  1980,  i.e., to  have  nuclear energy  and  solid fuels  together  producing 
70  to 75%  of  the electricity by  1990. 
,. 12.  This ;will  be  a  remarkable  achievement.  Considered  against  the  background 
of the  Community  as  a  whole,  this overall  capacity does  mask,  however, 
a  considerable diversity  in  the  national  situations.  In  1990,  some 
countries will still not  be  producing  any  electricity by  nuclear means, 
while  in the  same  year,  others  will  be  using  nuclear energy  as  the  main 
source  of  their electricity.  The  status of  the  current  nuclear power 
programmes  in the  Member  States  concerned  is presented  in the  following 
table. 
2.  The  strategic ·importance. oLoutlear,,energy 
13.  The  supply of  uranium,  the  raw  material  for  nuclea~ energy,  has  two 
positiveaspects in political terms  from  the  standpoint  of  the  Community, 
which  has  to  import  three-quarters of its nuclear  fuel: 
i)  the  world  uranium  market  is supplied  by  countries other  than  those 
which  provide  the  Community  with  hydrocarbons  (oil and  natural  gas>; 
ii)  those  couhtries  are  not .situated_ in  one  an~ the ~ame geographical 
area  nor  do  they falt  within  o~e and  the  same  sphere of political 
influence. ·'' .. 
.- 4 bi s  ":" 
The  share  of  nuclear  energy  in  the  Comnunity's  electricity and 
energy balance:  present  status and  probable  increases 
11983)  8 
I  D  F  It  NL  UK  EUR-10 
Installed nuclear 
power  capacity  3.5  11.1  27.2  1.3  0.5  8.4  51.9 
(GWe) 
Share  of electricity 
production  45.7  17.7  48.3  3.2  5.9  17.0  22.4 
(%) 
Share  of total 
energy  balance  15.0  6.7  21 .6  1.3  1.6  6.8  8.6 
(%) 
11990 1  8  D  F  It  NL  UK  EUR-10 
Installed  nuclear 
power  capacity  5.4  21.7  54.8  3.3  0.5  12.5  98.2 
(GWe) 
Share  of electricit> 
production  55  31  70  8  6  27  35 
(%) 
Share  of total 
energy  balance  18.0  ·.12. 7  36.5  3.1  1.6 .  9.0  14.1 
(%)  \ 
)  .. 
.  .  . ' .  . .... - 5  -
!n_?!a~tic!l_t!r~s, uranium  supplies at world  level  are  based  on  known 
r.esources  of ore  that  can  be  worked  at an  acceptable  cost  and  are  capable 
of  meeting  foreseeable  requirements  for  about  20  years.  As  regards  un-
discovered  resources,  it is believed that  they will  meet  the  requirements 
likely to arise during  the  20  years  that  will  follow.  In order 'for these 
resources  to be  placed on  the  market,  it is still necessary that  the 
appropriate  investments  that are  required  for  their identification and 
production be  made  in good  time. 
14.  !.~~  .. ~s~  ~f_u!_~.!2i!:!.!!!l  for  its part,  has  two  important  aspects: 
i)  Uranium  can  be  stored  in  large quantities at  low  cost,,without  giving 
rise to practical  difficultie~on account  of  the great  energy 
density of  the material.  At  present,  there are  stocks  in  the 
Community  capable  of meeting  the  requirements of present-generation 
reactor  types,  e.g.  light-water  reactors  CLWRs>  and  gas/graphite 
reactors  (Magnox  or  UNGG  and  AGRs>,  for  four  to five  years.<1> 
ii)  When  it is used  in these  types  of  reactor,  the  uranium  expends 
only  a  very  small  fraction~ - 2%)  of its energy  content.  The 
remainder,  which  can  be  utilised only  in a  new  reactor  type,  the 
!_a~t  _b.!:_e~d~  _r~a£_t~  CFBR >  ·  at present  being  demonstrated,  represents 
a  considerable quantity of material,  most  of  which  is in the  form  of 
spent  fuel  from  reactors of  the  present  generation which  has 
accumulated  since the start of  commercial  operation.  This  feature 
makes  it possible to  consider  the  nuclear energy  produced  by  fast 
breeder  reactors  as  ~i !:_tl:!_a.!:.h:.  !:_e'le~a!?_l~ ~n~gy. 
3.  The  economic benefits  of nuclear  energy 
15.  The  economic  benefits  of nuclear  energy  must  be  evaluated  from  the 
standpoint of three  closely-related aspects:  competitiveness,  balance 
of  payments  and  macroeconomic  impact. 
a)  The  competitiveness of electricity of  nuclear origin is constantly 
being  closely studied by  the  public authorities and  the electricity 
producers,  and  the  Commission  is intimately  involved  in these 
evaluations.  The  results of  the  evaluations are  in agreement:  when 
there  is an  open  choice  between  nuclear  fuel,  oil and  coal  as  energy 
sources  for  the  power  station to be  constructed over  the  next  few  years 
(  ) 
UNGG.  French  abbreviation  for  "natural-ur'lnium,  gas-graphite" 
•  (equivalent  to the  British Magnox)J 
AGR:  advanced  gas-cooled  reactor. - 6  -
and  intended  for  large-scale and  continuou~  el~ctricity prcidu~tion, 
nuclear  energy  is advantageous. 
16.  The  economic  advantage  of  nuclear power  ~ver  co~l(
1 )  varies  from  o~e 
Member  State to another  with  the  economic  conditions  in each  country, 
in particular the  specific  cost  of  labour,  the  scale and type of  the 
nuclear  programme  implemented  and  the  standardisation effected,  the 
nu.ber of  units  installed 6n  on~ site and  the  characteristics of  the 
. . 
':_ ..  ·;·~  _;  ~ -~ 
·~:  ~~- .. . \ 
·  ..  ' 
site, the  administrative  p~ocedures required  for  the  various  installati~~· 
phases  (from  construction to power  run-up>  and  the  price of  the  fuel  used  .. 
(domestit  coal  or  imported 'coal>C2>. 
On  the  basis of the  study  carried out  in 1983,  using  the  appropriate 
assumptions  for  each  country  in  the  c~lculations, it has  been  shown 
that  the  addition~l cost  of electricity  p~oduced from  coal  in  comparison 
with  the  cost of electricity of nuclear origin is as  follows(3}: 
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17.  As  regards  the  breakdown  of the  total  kWh  production  cost,  the  average 
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The  slight  impacf  of  nuclear  fuel  costs  - particularly uranium  - on  the 




Elect ri city prod.Jced  from  petroleun prociJcts  is more  expens·ive  in all countries 
than  that prociJced  from  coal. 
Irrespective of any  effects of environnental  protection regulations  1-!tlich  may  be 
important  with  ~spect to the  prod.Jction of electricity from  roal. 
For  the  case  of power  stations enterirg  into service in 1990. - 7  -
has  a  moderating  effect on  increases  in the  cost  of  other  energy 
sources. 
18.  The  production  cost  of electricity of  nuclear origin  is characterised 
by  high-fixed  investment  costs  and  by  low  variable operating costs. 
The  main  contribution to  be  made  by  nuclear  power  is to  ''base-Load · 
operation",  in other  words  that  of  production of electricity at 
maximum  possible plant  power  for  the  longest  possible period of  the 
year.  This  field  represents  appreciably more  than  half of  the 
C  .  I  L  .  .  d  t.  (1)  H  h  d  f  th  ommun1ty  s  e  ectr1c1ty pro  uc  1on.  owever,  t  e  a  vantage  o  e 
cost  of  nuclear  power  is  now  such  that  the  nuclear  power  stations 
remain  competitive,  even  with  a  utilisation factor  lower  than  that 
adopted  for  evaluating the  production cost  of  the  kWh  (approximately 
3  000  hours/year  instead of  6  500  hours/year).  This  considerably 
increases - to  over  65%  - the  share  which  nuclear  power  can  contribute 
economically to  meeting electricity requirements. (Z) 
19.  b)  Energy  plays  a  major  role  in the  balance  of  payments  of  countries  with 
indigenous  ene~gy resources.  This  role  is  independent  of  the  cost  of 
electricity production.  The  proportion of this cost  accounted  for  by 
the - presumably  imported  - primary energy  source varies  widely 
according to  whether  that  material  is uranium  (accounting for  Less 
than  10%  of  production costs>,  coal  (approximately 70%)  or oil 
(approximately 80%).  The  assumptions  concerning the  long-term trends 
in the  costs,of these materials  are certainly open  to discussion and 
(1)Even  if the  fraction is deducted  which  is covered  by  so-called 
"cheap" electricity production  (for  example  hydroelectric,  lignite, 
etc.>,  the  marginal  cost  of  which  is  low  but  the  available quantities 
of  which  are  limited. 
(Z)Th.  .  h  L  d  1s  1s  w y  contro  systems  a  apted  to  rapid  load variations will  be 
fitted progressively to the oldest  reactors  which  have  already been 
partly amortised. 20. 
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it is easily understood  that  such  discussions  can  become  a~imated 
if the  impact  that  an  error  o-f--- assessment  - always  possible  in  vie-w  ... 
of  the  Lifetime of  a  power  station - can  have  on  cost  estimates  for - -' 
oil- and  even  coal-fired staiions is  considered.  On  the.other  hand; 
it cannot  be  disputed  that  a  given amount  of electricity will  cost 
the  Community  as  a  whole  Less  - even  considerably  less - currency 
if it is generated by  nuclear power  stations. 
In addition to the  favourable  effect on  the  balance of  payments 
mentioned  above,  which  could  be  termed  a  "passive" effect since it 
results  in  avoiding  excessive expenditure,  there  is an  "active" effect 
which  results  from  exploiting  - to a  greater extent  than  is done  at 
'  ··-
present  - the  capacity of  t~e European  industry to export  power 
stations, equipment  and  services  in the  nuclear sector,  particularly 
fuel  cycle  services. 
21.  c)  The  macroeconomic  impact  of  nuclear  energy  results  from  the  fact  that 
it enables electricity t6 be  produced  at  a  cost that  depends  very 
little on  fluctuations  in  the  world  energy  source  materials  market. 
The  low  Level  and  the  stability of  the  cost  promote  the  competitive-
ness  of  the electricity consuming  industries  downstream  and,  further-
more,  naturally  constitute an  incentive  to the  wider  use  of electricity, 
most  particularly for  industrial purposes.  Finally,  the  fact  that  the· 
raw  material  (uranium) :accounts  for  very  Little of  the  cost of 
electricity of nuclear origin means  that  a  very  great  part  of  that_ 
cost  arises  from  the  value  added  by  European  industriesa 
There  is, however,  a  ~ualitative  impact~ also very appreci•ble,  which 
results  from  the  extremely  high  value of  the  technology employed  in 
all  phases  of  nuclear activity: design,  workshop  and  on-site  con-
struction, operation  a~d maintenance.  This  value  characterises all 
branches  of engineering:  nuclear,  civil,  mech_anical,  eLectricaL,· 
chemical  and  electronic,  and  also data-processing  and  software  in-
dustrie~, with  a  spinoff  effect  for  the  enormous  industrial  sector~ 
in  the  countries  concerned. - 9  -
C.  OBJECTIVES  OF  THE  ILLUSTRATIVE  PROGRAMME 
1.  The  outlook  for  1995-2000 
22.  In order  to  serve  as  a  useful  reference  point  in the development  of 
nuclear  energy,  the  illustrative objectives must  relate  to a  date  such 
that,  taking  into  consideration the  time  required  to  construct  nuclear 
installations,  the  corresponding  decisions  will  have  to  be  taken  over 
the  next  three years:  1985,  1986  and  1987.  In  this  connection,  the 
Commission  considers  that  the  target  date of 1995  should  be  retained. 
23.  The  Commission,  however,  acknowledges  that,  apart  from  giving  precise 
quantitative objectives  on  which  decisions are  to  be  taken  in the  short 
term,  it  is necessary to provide  the development  of  nuclear  energy  a  Longer 
term  perspective  which~  in this  case,  will  extend at  least  to the  turn 
of  the  century.  Without  this, the time-scale  required  to  amortise  the 
financial  and  technological efforts that  such  development  needs,  and  to 
make  these efforts pay,  would  be  insufficient. 
24.  If present forecasts  made  by  the  Member  States prove  to  be  correct,  only 
about  one  third of  the  Community's  total energy  requirements  will  be  met 
by  imported oil  in 1990.<1> However,  the possibility that  the  Community's 
own  oil production may  start to fall  in a  few  years•  time  could  create 
a  renewed  upward  trend  in oil  imports.  The  Community's  vulnerability to 
oil market  disturbances  consequently  requires  further  structural  changes 
in the  energy  supply  pattern which  promote,  in particular,  wider  use  of· 
electricity,  the  production of  which  is nuclear energy's  essential  role. 
25.  By  1990,  this  form  of energy  should account  for  about  35%  of electricity 
production  in the  Community,  but,  on  the  basis  of the  considerations set 
out  in the previous  Chapter,  it should  have  been  possible to attain a 
much  more  substantial objective  by  that  time  and  the  nuclear  industry 
would  have  been  in  a  position to  construct  the  corresponding  capacity. 
(1)As  compared  with  63%  in 1973. - 10  -
without .any·problems.  This  developmentj  however,  has  not  occurred,  as 
a  result of uncertainties  in the  demand  for  energy  and  owing  to ·difficulties 
of various origins, particularly the acceptability of nuclear  energy  to 
the  public and  the  conflict between  the  powers  of  local authorities and 
national authorities.  Moreover,  in certain cases,  priority was  given  to 
using  domestic  sources  of  ~ossil fuels. 
26.  In  view  of· the  existance  of  such  difficulties,  care  must  be  taken  not  to 
set  too  optimistic a  quantitative objective.  It is for  this  reason  that 
the  Commission  proposes  the  adoption of  the  following  lines  of  development 
for  nuclear  energy: 
(i)  to  produce  about  40%  of  Community  electricity in 1995,  and 
(ii)  subsequently to  increase its share  in electricity production 
considerably after  the  turn of  the  century. 
27.  The  analysis  of  ~he energy  supply  and  demand  picture  carried out  by  the 
Commission  services  in the  light  of  new  Lon~ term  energy  objectives  in~ 
dicates  that  electricity consumption  in the  Community  could  reach  1  470 
TWh(1)  by  1990  and  1  650  TWh  by  1995,  whereas  the  present  level  is  in  the 
vicinity of  1  230  TWh.  It emerges  from  this that  the  average  annual  growth 
rate  up  to  1995  will  be  about  2,3%"  This  value  might  subsequently turn out 
to  be  a  pessimistic one  and,  if  so,  the evaluation of  the  corres-
ponding  requirements  for  investments  in electricity production might 
have  to  be  revised  upward. 
28.  In  order  to  exceed  the  40%:share  of  the  total electricity production of 
'  '  1  650  TWh  estimated  for 1995,  the  nuclear  power  stations  would  have  to 
oroduce  over  660  TWh.  This. would  require  that  a  nuclear  capacity of  at 
. least 120  GWe(2)  be  installed by  that. date.  In  comparison  with  the 
capacity of  98  GWe  scheduled  to be  in service  by.1990,  this means  that 
< 1>1  1W"I  <Terawatt  hour>  = 1o12wh  = 109 kWh=  1rf I"W1  = 10S  G.tl. 
(2)1his estimate  is based  on  the asSUJption of a modest  increase  in the  average  load  factor 
of the  Conm.nity's  ruclear  power  stations, which  will increase from  61%  in 1982  to 
63%  in 1995.  lhere are  sare  indications of a probable  illl>rovement  in the  Load  factors, 
particularly the  positive  results seen  in  the  experience  accumulated  by the  reactor 
c.perators  ard  the  decrease  in .the  share  of  new power  stations  (those roost  beset  by 
teething problems)  corrp3red  with  the total I"UU''Jer  of power  stations installed. Q1  the 
other  haro,  it carn:>t  be expected that all the  ruclear power  stations wilL  cover  only 
base-load demand;  this tends  ~o limit the  achieveable  load  factors. - 11  -
the net  increase  in the  nuclear power  capacity between  1990  and  1995 
will  have  to  be  greater  that  22  GWe.  Taking  into account  a  loss  of  3  to 
4  GWe  resulting  from  the  decommissioning  of old nuclear power  stations 
which  is  likely to take place  in  the first  half of  the  1990s,  it can  be 
·seen  that: 
The  total  requirement  for additional  nuclear  power  capacity 
will  exceed  25  GWe  between  1991  and  1995. 
29.  It emerged  from  the  Commission's  consultations  with  the  sectors  con-
cerned that  the  development  of  nuclear  power  production  capacities  in 
the  individual  Member  States  could  be  expected  to be  as  follows: 
In  service 
0  .  .  .. ('f)  ecomm1 ss  1om ng  New  capacity  In  service 
1990  1990-1995  1990-1995  1995 
GWe  GWe  Reactors  Gwe  Reactors  GWe 
8  5.4  0.010  1  1.3  1  6  .• 7 
0  21.7  0.016  1  3.3  3  25.0 
F  54.8  1.3  3  10.9  8  64.4 
I  3.3  0.460  2  8.0  8  10.8 
NL  0.5  - '  - 1.0  1  1 .5 
UK  12.5  2.051  12  1.1  1  11.6 
Total  98.2  3.8  19  25.6(2'  22  120~0 
Should  these estimates turn out  to  be  correct,  it is evident that  the 
minimum  nuclear objective  for  1995  will  involve  an  intensity of effort 
which  will  vary  widely  from  one  Member  State to another. 
<1>'1'1-e  estirrate  is based  on  an assuned plant  lifetime of 30 years. This  is only a 
reference  point.  The  power  stations may  actually be  kept  operatirg  looger  or be 
decommissioned  earlier. 
(2)A  45%  nuclear share of electricity prod.Jctioo  by  1995  w:x.~ld require  the installatioo 
of additional nuclear capacity aro.Jntirg  to about  40  GE  between 19SU  a1d  1995. :.'.' 
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2.  The  future  in the  longer  term 
30.  The  reactors  of  the  present  generation will  be  progressively  improved 
and  will  continue  to  be  constructed  for  several  further  decades.  In 
parallel, other,  "advanced"  types  of  reactor  should  reach  industrial 
maturity.  Thus  high-temperature  reactors  (HTRs>,  capable  of providing 
industrial  heat  for  advanced  technological  applications,  could eventually 
be  used  for  the  special  purposes  of  coal  liquefaction,  stimulation of oil 
flow  in  highly viscous deposits,  reduction of metal  oxides,  etc. It is, 
however,  the  fast  breeder  reactors,  which,  in the  long  term,  seem  most 
likely to be  foremost  in power  production. 
31.  The  fast  breeder  reactors  CFBRs>  which,  in  comparison  with  reactor  types 
of  the  present  generation,  are  likely to multiply  the energy  potential 
of  ur~nium by  a  factor of  6ver  50,  are  undergoing  technological  develbp~ 
ment  ~n most  countries which  possess  considerable  industrial potential 
(e.g.,  the  USA,  the  USSR  and  Japan).  Such  development,  however,  is most 
advanced  in the  Community,  where  this  reactor  concept  has  reached  the 
demonstration  stage  with  a  reactor possessing  a  capacity  close  to  that 
of  the  most  modern  current  reactors  (Superph~nix, 1  200  MWe). 
32.  The  present  situation  in  the  uranium  market  does  not  require  that  FBRs 
be  placed  in  comme~cial operation  in the  short  term.  Moreover,  the 
economic  performance  that  these  reactors  could attain in the  near  future 
should make  them  competitive  with  coal-fired power  stations,  but  not  with 
the  reactors at present  being  con~tructed in the  C6mmunity.  .  . 
·'  i 
'  •J 
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33.  However,  after the  target  year  2000,  it will  be  very advantageous  to 
possess  a  reactor  type,  such  as  the  FBR,  which  will  be  capable  of 
reducing  the  Community's  dependence  on  uranium  imports  and  of  setting 
a  reasonable  ceiling to any  rise  in the price of  that  raw  material;  in 
other words,  a  type  that  will  enable satisfactory uranium  supply  con-
ditions to be  maintain~d for  as  long  as  possible. 
34.  In all events,  in view  of the  already  very  advanced  stage  of  development 
of  the  FBR  type,  it would  not  be  judicious  to wait  until difficulties  in 
the  supply of uranium seemed  likely to arise before  preparing  for  the 
commercial  introduction of  such  reactors,  especially since  that  transition 
can  be  achieved  with  limited  cost  only if the  efforts of all the  parties 
concerned  in various  capacities,  Member  States, producers,  designers  and 
constructors,  are  properly programmed  and  coordinated  within the  Community. 
35.  In  consequence,  the  Commission  proposes  that  investments  in  FBRs  have 
the objective of making  this  type of  reactor  economically  competitive 
by  2005 •. 
36.  By  that date  (2005),  the  Community  industry should  be  in  a  position to 
offer  the  electricity producers  commercially  viable  FBR  power  stations 
capable  of producing  power  at a  cost  at  least  comparable  to that of  the 
power  produced  by  power  stations  equipped  with  traditional  reactors 
constructed at that  time.<1> 
(1)T  th"  h  f"  .  •  •  .  •  ~n  ,,s event  t  e  1rst  compet1t:1.v.e  FBR  power  stat1or.1s  would  enter 









37.  To  this  end, the  appropriate  industrial  strategy must  be  carefully worked  out:  the 
entire system  which  characterises the  concept,  including the  fuel  cycle,  should 
be  taken  into consideration  and  the  installations to  be  ordered  should  be  defineda 
.... 
~8.  The  Commission  considers  that  a  reasonable  scenario  would  be  as  follows: 
economic  and  financial  feasibility study of  a  programme  for  the  construction of 
a  small  number  of power  stations to  be  constructed  consecutivelya  It  would 
appear  that  four  stations  would  be  most  appropriate; 
their design  would  be  progressive  and  make  the  most  of  the  experience  acquired 
during  the  construction and  operation of  previous  power  stations, starting with 
Superph6nix  which  will  enter  into service  in  1985;(1) 
a  plant  for  reprocessing their  irradiated fuel  elements,  with  a  capacity suit-
able  for  establishing  with  adequate  certainty the  cost  of  that  reactor  type's 
fuel  cycle,  would  be  operational  at  the appropriate  time. 
39.  In order  to  possess sufficient operating experience  in  respect  of  the  five  in~ 
stallations covered  by  the  programme  sketched out  above, 
it would  be  advisable  for  the  construction of  the  next  FBR  power  station 
to  be  started in 1987  and  for  the  reprocessing plant  to  be  in  service 
before  2000. 
'*** 
40.  The  decisions  to  be  taken  in  the  immediate  future  will  have  an  effect  on  the 
energy situation in  Europe  well  beyond  the next  three decadesa  There  is nothing 
unusual  about  this if reference  is made  to the  time  constants of  energy  in-
dustries.  The  particular aspect  of  the  proposed  strategy is that  it is  aimed  at 
bringing about  an  essential  change  within  one  energy sector,  the  nuclear  sector, 
which-achieved  industrial  maturity  and  full  economic  competitiveness only a 
decade  ago.  Because  of  that  aspect  it is  indispensable that  the  investors  benefit 
from  the full  support  of  the authorities, it being undersiood  that  the  res-
ponsibility for  the  implementation of  this strategy,  in particular the  fdu~ding 
of it, rests  with  them. 
(1)  The  progressive  development  which  should  characterise· th~ design  of  the  four 
power  stations  in the series  following  on  from  Superp.hEmh  could  be  achieved 
in  two  main  phases,  each  involving two  power  stations of  similar design  con-
structed over  periods  of  time  that  are  fairly  close  together.  The  positive 
effects of ruccession  (two  design  stage~ between  Superph6nix  and  the  competitive 
power  stations)  and  those  of series  construct.ion  (two  similar  power  stations 
at  each  stage)  wo·uld  thus  be  combined,  while  the opportunities  for  international 
cooperation  would  be  multiplied. - 15  -
41.  The  agreement  on  cooperation,  signed on  10  January  1984  by  five 
Member  States  (Belgium,  France,  Italy,  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany. 
and  the  United  Kingdom),  reflects that  fact  and  shows  that  the  States 
concerned  are  aware  of  the  need  for  their commitment  to that  change. 
Corollary of the  longer-term objective:  plutonium  management 
42.  ALL  uranium-fuelled  nuclear power  stations,  whether  the  uranium  is 
natural  or enriched,  produce  plutonium  within  the  fuel  elements.  This 
is the  case,  in particular,  with  PWRs  and  FBRs,  on  which  the  development 
of  nuclear power  in  the  Community  will  henceforth  be  mainly  based. 
43.  All  the  Member  States -and the  Community  itself - have  chosen  the option 
of  reprocessing  spent  fuel  elements  which,  among  other advantages, 
possesses  that of  recovering  the  plutonium  by  means  of  which  the  FBRs 
can  make  use  of all the  uranium's  energy  content. 
44.  Although  there  is a  certain measure  of  interdependence  between  the 
implementation  of  programmes  for  the  construction and  operation of 
nuclear power  stations and  that of  the  reprocessing  plant, it is not 
possible  to  ensure  that  the  flow  of  available  plutonium will  correspond 
exactly to  the  demand  arising  from  the  FBR  programme.  It is currently 
estimated  that  the  FBR  objective  proposed  above  will  absorb only part 
of  the  plutonium  to  be  produced  by  the  reprocessing  plants  between  now 
and  the  end  of  the  century. 
45.  Temporary  storage  of  the  excess  plutonium  can  be  considered,  although  it 
gives  rise to a  technical  problem  as  a  result of  the  radioactive decay 
characteristics of one  of  the  plutonium  isotopes. 
46.  This  characteristic provides  an  additional  reason  for  seriously  con-
sidering another  use of  plutonium,  namely,  in  reactors of  the  present 
generation;  this  is termed  "plutonium  recycling". 
i 
. j 
,'  : 
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47.  This  technique,  which  has 'reached  the stage of  industrial application 
in  the  Community,  is certainly not  as efficient as  the  FBR  technique  in 
extracting  energy  from  uranium,  but  it poes  enable  substantial  sav-Ings 
t  b  d  .  .  t.  d  .  .  .  h  .t  .  ' 1)  o  e,ma  e  1n  uran1um  consump  10n  an  1n  enr1c  men  serv1ces. 
Finally,  only part of  the  plutonium  used  in this  ~ay is  consumed,  so  that 
thermal  recycling  will  not  compromise  subsequent  development  of  the  FBR 
concept. 
48.  Intensified  intra-European  cooperation  in this field  would  make  it 
possible  to  obtain  the  maximum  benefit  from  all the  technological  ex-
perience acquired  by  the  various  Community  partners  and  from  already 
existing  investments • 
··-:-.  _,. 
.  ' ... ·:  ·"' 
'•  .·.· 
'·:' . 
c1)Ann.nting  to aba.at  10 to 1S%  of  the. esti~t~·~i~ts  for  uranium  and enrictment 
services  l4l  to the year  2CXD;  savings  tiO:Jld:j)e of the on::ler- of 2 to  5%  on  the  cost of 
ruclearkltkl.  .,  .·.  "0.  ·-,  ·  • 
·' 
.  ,-.•' 
.  ·-·:· 
·:- . ...  . '. 
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D.  WHAT  ATTAINMENT  OF  THE  OBJECTIVES  INVOLVES: 
THE  COMMISSION'S  RECOMMENDATIONS 
49.  Attainment  of  the  objectives set out  in the  previous  chapter,  whether 
it involves  the  shorter-term objectives,  1995-2000,  or the  longer-term 
objective  is within  the  capacity of the  economies  of  the  Community 
Member  States and  within  the  range  of their technologies.  It does, 
however,  presuppose  programming  appropriate  to the  time  scale of the 
problems  raised. 
1.  The  role of  the public  autho~ities and  the electricity producers 
50.  Firstly,  attainment of  these objectives clearly  involves  continuation 
of  the efforts made  in the  Community  by  the  public authorities to  promote 
the  development  of nuclear  energy.  It also involves,  more  specifically, 
and  with  a  view·  to  rationalising nuclear policies within  the  Community, 
consultations  between  Member  States and  between  electricity producers 
with  regard  to their programme  decisions  and  investments.  A realistic 
price for electricity will  be  needed  to obtain the  required  level  of 
f .  .  l  .  t  (1)  1nanc1a  1nves  ment. 
51.  Regarding  investment  choices,  the  Commission  considers  that  the  acquisition 
by  electricity producers  of  holdings  in nuclear power  stations installed 
in neighbouring  countries·must  be  encouraged,  since  it enables  the  increase 
in  the  nuclear power  capacity to be  spread over  a  period of  time  in 
acco~dance with  the  specific  requirements  of  certain countries or even 
of  certain  regions.  The  examples  that already exist are  very  encouraging 
and  indicate  that  a  certain amount  of  programmed  reciprocity - the 
principle of  "mutual  investments"- will give  the  partners equal 
benefits. 
52.  In  addition,  the  cross-frontier acquisition of  holdings  provides  the 
industries  in  the  partner  countries  with  an  effective means  of achieving 
the  international  cooperation that  has  long  been  desired.  It also offers 
the  electricity producers  the  opportunity  to obtain greater  benefit  from 
the  international grid, the  capacity of  that  grid being  adapted  in  good 
time to  handle  th~  ex~ected volume  of  power  transfers. 
< 1  >s  th.  b  h  ·  ·  ·  ·  ee  e  report  y  t  e  Comm1ss1on  serv1ces  on  the  application  in 
Member  States.of tho principles of  ener  y  pricing  in  the  Community 
(COrti  84(490)  of  18.9  .84.  .. 2. 
- 18  -
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53.  For  its part,  the  Commission  undertakes to take  every 1 initiative in  i-ts':  · 
power,  at  the  appropriate  time  ~nd to  the  extent  necessary,  to  furthe~ 
the  application of  the  strategy set out  in  the  preceding  chapter.  In 
particular,  the  nature  and  size of  the  investment  needed  to attain the· 
objectives  could  imply  a  requirem~nt for  both  Community  and  national  · · 
financi~l instruments. 
'".-;., 
;  . 
Uranium  supplies{1) 
·.' ... 
54.  As  regards  the  general  uranium  supply situation,  although  the  supply  anq  . 
demand  situation is  known,  it is still difficult  to  predict  how  the  mar:ket 
wiLl  fluctuate. 
The  Community  is heavily dependent  on  outside sources  for  its supply of 
uranium.  To  mitigate  the  effects of uncertainties  in  the  market  on  uranium 
supplies,  it  is desirable  for  these  to  continue to be  obtained  under  long-
term  contracts.  Such  contracts  can  have  a  stabilising effect on  the  mark~i 
to the  benefit  of  both  producers  and  consumers. 
55.  As  regards  more  specifically security of  supply from  the  standpoint  of 
resources,  although  companies  ·in  the  Community  have  made--considerable 
financial  investment  in mining  activities throughout  the  wo\Ld,  the  cut-
backs  in prospecting that  can  now  be  observed  are  Likely  to make  the 
Community  even  more  dependent  on  those  few  countries  which  possess  mines 
capable  of  being  worked  at  low  cost.  It must  thus  be  hoped  that  the 
decrease  in expenditure on  exploration,  which,  if continued,  would  Limit. 
the  necessary  di~ersification of  the  Community's  supply-sources,  is only  . 
a  temporary  phenomonen. 
(1 )A  l  .  f  h.  b.  .  d  .  h  A  n  ana  ys1s  o  t  1s  su  ]ect 1s  presente  1n  t  e  nnex. - 19  -
56.  In  view  of  the  foregoing,  it is desirable  for  the  Community  to  im-
plement  a  supply  strategy capable  of: 
- encouraging the  Member  States  and  the  •:ompanies  involved 
to  continue  their prospecting activities both  within their own 
territories and  outside the  Community; 
to  continue  these  activities, if necessary  with  Community  support, 
on  a  scale  which  is  independent  of  the  state of  the  market  at  any 
giv'en  moment,  b~aring in  mind  the  expectP.d  requirements ofthe 
electricit~-~roducers and  th~ considerable  lead  times  required  to 
bring  new  mines  into production; 
- encouraging  the  companies  active  in this  sector to  pursue  storage 
policies  likely 
to offset  market  fluctuations  and  any  interruption of  supplies 
from  non-Community  supplier  countries; 
to  Lessen  any  tensions  that  exsit  between  the  Community  and  the 
supplier  countries  in  respect of  supplies,  while providing  the 
Latter  with  stable and  predictable outlets  for  their products, 
thereby  assuring  them  of  a  reasonable  return on  their  investments 
and  of  a  regular  income. 
3.  The  nuclear fuel  i~duitry 
a)  Enrichment<1> 
57.  On  the  basis of  existing  capacities and  of  the  inves.tment  programmes 
that  are  being  implemented,  it is estimated that  the  world  supply  of 
enrichment  services will  exceed  demand  until at  least  the  middle  of the 
next  decade.  In  consequence;  decisions  relating to  new  investments, 
with  the  exception of  those  concerning  the  industrial-scale demonstration 
of  advanced  technologies  that  ensure  a  significant  reduction  in  costs, 
do  not  have  to  be  taken  before  the end  of this decade.  The  need  for 
new  investments  in existing processes  beyond  this period  cannot, 
however,  be  excluded. 
(1) 
An  analysis of  this subject  is presented  in the  Annex. - 20  ..:. 
58.  In  the  Long  term,  this sector  may  see the  emergence  of  new  technologies 
which  are  more  economi.cal  and  provide greater  flexibility in  adaptin~ 
investments  to  demand.  For  this  reason,  it is advisable  to continue 
- . 
research  and  development  work  in this field on  an  adequate  scale  in 
the  Community. 
59.  In  view  of  the  state of  the  market  and  of  its development  prospects, 
which  are  Likely  to  compromise  the  economic  viability-of  the  European 
undertakings  in this sector,  the  Commission  proposes  that  ~n exchange 
of  views  take  place  at  Community  Level  between  the parties  concerned. 
b) 
In  this  connection, it wishes  to  point  out  that  an  appropriate  structure 
exists in  which  such  an  exchange  of  views  could  take  place;  this is 
the  Standing  Committee  on  Uranium  Enrichment  (COPENUR)  set  up  by  the 
Council  on  22  May  1973. 
L  L  f  b 
.  •  (1)  Fue  -e ement  a  r1cat1on 
60.  1)  As  regards  the  fabri6ation of enriched  uranium  oxide  fuel  elemerits, 
.it is necessary  to  extend the  calls  for  bids  to  suppliers other  than 
·those  who  sup.pl i ed  the first  cores  as  part  of  the  order  for  the 
reactor. 
'In addition,  there  is  an  advantage  in  continuing  the  development  of 
,new  types  of  fuel  elements  which  will. make  it possible to  increase 
uranium  burn-up  and  the  duration of-the  reactor  cycles. 
2)  The  development  and  fabrication  of  uranium  and  plutonium  mixed-
oxide  fuel  elements  should  be  vigorously pursued, first  with  a 
view  to  promoting  com~ercial recycling  in  LWRs  of  the  materials 
'• 
· ~esulting from  reprocessing  (uranium  and  ~lutonium) and  Later  with 
the' purpose  of optimising the entire  FBR  fuel  cycle.  In this 
connection,  close  coo~eration between  designers,  fuel  manufacturers, 
reprocessor~ and  ele~tricity producers -should  be  ~ricouraged. 
(1 )A n  analysis  of  this  s~bject is  pres~nted in  the  Annex. - 21  -
(1) 
c)  Reprocessing  and  temporary  storage of  spent  fuel 
6t.  A large  part  of  the  demand  for  reprocessing services  from  users 
within  the  Community  and  elsewhere  is already  covered  by  firm 
contracts  between  Community  users  and  service suppliers.  However, 
in  spite of  the uncertainties  inherent  in  any  estimate,  the  growth 
prospects  are  such  that  a  competitive  market  could  eventually arise 
in  this sector,  as  indicated  in the  report  by  the  ad-hoc  Committee 
on  the  Reprocessing of  Irradiated  Fuel  (CORECOM). (2) 
62.  The  Commission's  recommendations(2)  that  accompanied  the  publication 
of  the  CORECOM  report  are still valid  in  their entirety.  In particular, 
that: 
decisions  be  taken  and  implemented  as  soon  as  possible to ensure 
that  programmes  for  the  construction of  the  capacities  required 
for  the  stor·age  of  irradiated fuel  be  completed  by  the  appropriate 
time;· 
all  possibl~ ways  of  setting-up  reprocessing facilities  capable  of 
meeting  the needs  expressed  in  several  Member  States  be  explored; 
industrial  cooperation  within  the  Community  be  encouraged  by 
adopting  as  open  an  attitude as  possible to  the question  of 
technology transfers and  exchanges  of  experience,  particularly in 
the field of  plant  safety. 
63.  Although  commercial  reprocessing of  mixed-oxide  <uranium-plutonium) 
spent  fuel  from  existing  reactors  can  be  carried out  in plants  which 
reprocess  uranium  oxide  fuel,  it is necessary  to  continue  wo~k on 
developing  methods  to the stage  of  industrial  maturity for the 
reprocessing of  spent  fuel  from  fast  breeder  reactors.  A demonstration 
plant,  capable of  dealing  with  spent  fuel  from  several  FBRs,  should 
be  constructed  in  accordance  with  the objectives  set  out  above  <see 
p3ragraph  40). 
('!)A  t  .  f  th. .  b.  .  n  ana  ys1s  o  1s  su  ]ect  1s  presented  in  the  Annex. 
< 2>c  ·  ·  f  h  ornrrjunlcat10n  rom  t  e  Commission  to  the  Council,  COM(82) 37 final 
of  February  1982c 
' 
.:. d)  Radioactive  wastes<1> 
64.  The  management  of  radioactive  wastes  is covered  in the  PINC  because it is 
one  of  the  industrial operations  ~f the nuclear  fuel  cycle.  The  safety 
aspects  have  been  dealt  with  in  the "Community  plan  of  action  for  radio-
active  wastes"  approved  by  the  Council  on  18  February  1980(2), which  covers 
the period  from  1980  to  1992  and  which  was,  in 1983,  the  subject  of  a  first 
(3)  progress  report  • 
It is  recalled  (see  paragraphs  7  to 9)  that  the  safety aspects of  nuclear 
energy,  about  which  public  opinion  is  ~articularly sensitive,  were  the 
subject  of  a  recent  communication. 
65.  The  management  of  low- and-medium-activity  radioactive  waste  (excluding alpha-
contaminated  waste),  which  accounts  for  almost  95%  of  the  conditioned  waste 
produced  today  in the  Community,  benefits  from  lo~g industrial  experience. 
However,  it is obviously  advis~ble to allow it to  continue  to  benefit  from 
technological  progress. 
Decisions  concerning the selection and  opening-up  of  new  sites for  the dis-
posal  of  wastes  in this category will  have  to  be  t'aken  in good  time. 
66.  Satisfactory results  have  been  obtained  with  the  treatment  and  conditioning 
of  radioactive  waste  contaminated  by  long-lived  alpha  emitters  and  of 
high-activity  waste  (for  example  vitrification>.  It  is nonethelesi necessary 
to  continue  current  research  and  development  work  in order to  optimise 
these  results.  As  regards  the disposal  of  such  wastes,  the  work.conducted 
at  national  and  Community  level  by  the  Commission  through  multiannual 
research  and  development  prog~ammes has  made  it possible  to  confirm  the 
feasibility of  setting-up  storage  installations  in  deep  geological 
formations.  It is necessary to  supplement  and  further  validate these 
studies~ parti6ularly by  impl~menting the development'  and  demonst~ation 
of  the  techniques. 
67~  A regional  approach  to  the  pr9blem  of- waste  disposal,  involving  several 
countries,  could offer  certai':l  advantages  insofar as  it would  prevent 
costly storage  projects  from  being  undertaken  prematurelY  and  on  an 
individual  basis.  Such  a  solution  would  seem  to be  indispensable  in  the 
case  of  countries that  have  limited  nuclear_programmes. 
(1 )A  l  .  f  h.  n  ana  ys1s  o  t  1s 
(2)official  Journal  of 
(3)COM(83)  262  final~ 
I 
subject  is presen:ted.in  itie  Annex. 
29.2.1980,  c 51 •. 
_,. 4. 
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The  real  problem  arising from  a  regional  approach  is the  fact  that, 
at  present,  no  country  is  willing to  agree  to  the final  storage of 
waste  from  another  country  on  its territory. 
Since  the  countries  concerned  are  Community  Member  States, it would.· 
b~ desirable,  in  a  spirit of  mutual  assistance, to  seek  solutions that 
would  enable  one  country to  store  waste  originating in other  countries, 
while  complying  with  the principle of  equitable  reciprocity  in the  long 
term.  The  application of  this principle  would  enable  storage  centres 
to  be  set  up  under  the  best  possible conditions, taking  into account 
the  varying  requirements  of  the  different  Member  States'  nuclear 
programmes.  In  addition, it would  enable  the  most  appropriate  geological 
units  in  the  European  substratum to  be  used. 
6&  Studies  underway  at  Community  level,  such  as  the definition of  equivalence 
between  different  types  of  waste  which  is being  undertaken  with  a  view 
to seeting-up specialised storage facilities  for  certain waste  types 
irrespective of their origin, are  an  important  element  in  a  Community 
approach  to the  disposal  of  radioactive  waste  along  the  lines  indicated 
~bove. The  Commission  believes that  these studies  should  aim  at  providing 
concrete  results  which  would  make  it possible to set  up  a  waste  disposal 
system of  the  regional  type described above. 
.  (t) 
The  transport  of  nuclear  fuel 
69.  The  transport  of  nuclear  fuel  in all its forms  - from  ore  to  radio-
active  waste,  and  including,  in particular,  uranium  hexafluoride; 
irradiated.el~ments and  plutonium - is an  essential part  of  the  n~clear 
supply  system. 
70.  It is hence  of vital  importance  for  the  Member  States to  take  the 
requisite measures  so  that  the  transport operations,carried out  by 
specialised operators  in  full  compliance  with  the  safety standards, 
never  suffer  from  administrative obstacles that  result  in difficulties 
or  delays.  This  concern  certainly applies  to cross-frontier operations, 
but  it can  also  apply to operations  within  a  country. 
(1 )A  h  l  .  f  h.  s  ort  ana  ys1s  o  t  1s  topic  is  contained  in the  annex. 5. 
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h  .  f  l  -.  ' 1)  T e  construct1on o  nuc  ear power  stat1ons 
71.  The  existing situation within  the  Community  is characterised by  the 
fact  that  two  reactor types,  PWR  and  FBR,have  been  mainly,  but  not 
exclusively,  chosen  as  the  basis  for  the  development  of  nuclear  energy 
in  the  foreseeable  future. 
72.  Such  near-uniformity  incTeases  the  technological  understanding of 
the  designs  in question  and,  as  a  resultp  strengthens still further 
the  confidence  already placed  in  them.  It  should  also facilitate 
intra-Community  trade  in  equipment  and  the  implementation  of  joint 
construction projects.  Both  of  these  are  - in  principle at  Least  -
permanent  objectives of  the  Community  strategy for  the  development 
of  nuclear energy with,  as  a  corollary,  the  promotion  of  exports. 
73.  It  must  nonetheless  be  kept  in  mind  that  an essential  basis  of  this· 
strategy is the  laying down  of  common  design  and  construction  rules 
based  on  data  that  have  already  had  their validity confirmed  in  a 
considerable  number  of  cases. 
74.  The  predominance  of  PWRs  and  FBRs,  together  with  the  option  of  re-
cycling  in the  former  plutonium  that  has  not  been  allocated to the 
Latter,  occurs  at  a  time  when,  even  in the  case  of  Member  States  with 
the  most  ambitious  nuclear  programmes,  the  proSpects  for  the  nuclear 
market  are  tending to  look  bleaker  rather  than  brighter.  The  industry 
is entering a  transitional phase  where  the  size of  the  market  is deter-
mined  by  developments  in the overall  economy  and  not  by  any  measures 
it may  take.  It mustF  therefore,  progressively diversify its production, 
in  particular to  make  a  suitable place  for  the  FBRs. 
It is unfortunate  that  the  adaptation  required  by  this transition  has 
to  take  place  at  a  time 'of  general  excess  construction  capacityo  This 
excess  also affects  conventional  power  stations that  could  other~ise 
have  provided an  emergency  outlet  for  the  nucl~ar construction  industry. 
An  analysis  of  this tdpic  is contained in  th~ annex. - 25  -
75.  As  regards  the  FBRs,  it seems  that  the  present  situation is favourable 
to the  setting-up of  an  industrial  structure, the  style  and  capacities 
of  which· would  be  commensurate  with  the  needs  of  the  European  market. 
As  has  been  the  case  with  the  construction of  Superphenix,  there  will 
be  opportunities  for  those particularly qualified firms  in all the 
countries  involved. 
76.  The  industrial  rationalisation  required does  not  necessarily have  to 
result  in  an  integrated structure, but  neither  should it reject  such 
a  possibility from  the outset. 
In  any  case  it should  result  in  the  creation of  a  true  common  market 
in  FBRs,  even  though,  at  present,  certain Member  States  are  not 
seeking to  construct  reactors  of  that  type  on  their territories. 
77.  It is most  desirable that  the  rationalisation  in question,  the object 
of  which  is to  provide  the  industry concerned  with  the  construction 
of  FBRs  in the  Community  with  an  appropriate  structure,  should  not 
be  restricted to that  particular sector.  It should also take  account 
of  the  PWR  sector  and  rationalise it. Difficult  though  this task  may 
be,  it will  have  to  be  accomplished  sooner or  later(1). 
C
1
>N.B.:  Rationalisation of this sort  may  involve  concerted practices 
likely to  come  under  Community  rules on  competition:  the 
principle of  prohibition  laid down  in  Article  85  (1) of  the 
EEC  Treaty  implies  that  the  Commission  will  keep  a  check  on 
concerted practices.  The  Commission  may,  of  course,  grant  an 
exemption  on  the  basis of  Article 85  (3)  in certain 
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REVIEW  OF  AND  PROSPECTS  FOR  THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  NUCLEAR  ENERGY  IN  THE  COMMUNITY 
1.  The  role  of electricity in  the  economy 
1.  Electricity is  an  essential  part  of  the  Community's  energy  infrastructure 
and  plays  an  increasingly  important  role  in  the  economic  development  of  the 
Community. 
2.  Since  1973,  and  in particular since  1979,  there  has  been  a  very  appreciable 
decrease  within  the  Community  in  the  ratio of .the  demand  for  energy  to  the  gross 
domestic  producte  Since  the  gross  domestic  consumption  of  energy  fell  by  about 
56  Mtoe  between  1973  and  1983  whereas  the  gross  domestic  product  increased  by 
208  000  million  ECU  <at  1975  value),  the  rate  of  energy  intensity  <the  quantity 
of  energy  required  for  the  production  of  one unit  of  value  added)  dropped  from 
0.83  kgoe/ECU  (1973)  to  0.66  kgoe/ECU  (1983). 
3.  This  development  is  a  result  of  the  energy  savings  achieved  in  the 
liresidential  and  tertiary",  "transport"  and  "industry"  s~ctors and  of  the 
profound  modification  of  the  structure of  economic  activity:  decrease  in 
the  share  of  the activities  which  are  large  consumers  of  energy .and  increase 
in  the  share  of  the  services. 
4.  As  regards  electricity consumption,  there  has  been  an  opposing  trend 
which  reflects  an  increase  in  the  share of electricity in total  energy 
consumption  and  a  greater  contribution by  electricity to the  Community's 
economy.  In  1973,  0.94  kWh  was  consumed  for  every  ECU  of  the  GNP.  In  1983, 
that  figure  increased  to 0.99  kWh/ECU. 
5.  Maintenance of  the  relationship between  economic  growth  and  the  growth 
in electricity consumption  depends  on  market  factors  such  as: 
- the  future  opportunities  for. specific  uses  of electricity  (lighting,  power 
and  traction,  certain  industrial  processes,  control  functions,  etc.>; 
\ - 2  -
the  rate of electricity savings  achievable  through  the  introduction of 
more  efficient  equipment; 
- the  cost  of electricity, the  trend of  relative  energy  prices  and  the 
resulting  competitiveness of electricity in applications  in  which  it  is 
capable of  replacing other  energy  sources  (for example  heating,  air 
conditioning  and  transport). 
The  role of electricity will  also depend  on  the  choice  which  certain 
Member  States will  make,  particularly as  regards  the development  of 
nuclear  energy  which  can  be  delivered  only  through  that  medium. - 3  -
2.  Nuclear  energy  production· 
(a)  Progress  since  197~ · 
6.  At  .th~  ti·me  of the-first oil crisis  in  1973-74,  t·he  industrial-scale  .... ,  · 
application of nuclear  energy  was  still in  its  initi~l.-stages.  With  the-·  ...  ·.  ~· 
rapid  rise  iD  oil prices,  concern  about  the  costs of  producing  elect.rici.ty'.--·;_.:. 
by  usi-ng  oil  reinfo-rced existing  concern  about  secud.~y of  supplie~~-.:  ..  ·  ·.·  <-~;,·.  :: 
As  a  result,  ambitious programmes  were  put  in  ha~d to  reconvert  to  ~-oal_:·  ·<~·;;~~·;,:  __ · 
·and  to  make  Large-scal_e  use  of  nuclear  energy  in the electricity  generating:.~_;;;?;; 
.  _  .  ..,·:,•.<  •. 
~;~~~~·  ;_-::·~  -~ .  indust.ry  .•  _,  .··::. 
<  ~ '.  I 
. .  . . .  . 
7.  Netther  the  electricit-y demand  prospects  on  which  the  nuclear  programme'~':· 
.·'  ,' 
were  based  nor  the  nuclear  construction  programmes  have  turned  out  a's  expecte~~ 
The  downward  revision of  the estimates of electricity demand  and  public 
. anx.i:et;  resulted. in  considerable  reductions  in  the  nucLear  programmes. 
8.  In spi1;e  of  these  developments,  nuclear  energy  has  significantly  incr~as·~d 
its  role over  the  Last  .ten  years.  In 1973,  only  5%  of electricity productio~ 
in  the  Community  was  of  nuclear  origin1  by  1978  that  share  had  doubled  to 
10%  of  the total  and -reached  22.4%  in  1983. 
9.  The  increasing  impo~tance of  nuclear  energy  has  been  particularly 
.evident  in  the  Community  in  comparison  with  developments  in the  other  main 
industrialized  countries  such  as  the  United  States  and  Japan  <see  Fig.  1). 
.  .  .  .  . 
In  1973,  th~ shares  o~  eiectri~ity producti6n  in  the  ~ommuni~y and  the - 4  -
United  States  accounted  for  by  nuclear  energy  were  approximately  equal 
(4%  and  5%,  respectively)•  ·:~Japan that  share  was  somewhat  less  (2%). 
In  1983,  the  share of  nuclear  energy  in  the  Community  reached  22.4%  as 
already mentioned,  whereas  in  the  United  States  and  Japan  it did  not 
exceed  12.6%  and  18%,  respectively.1 
10.  Total  <net)  nuclear  ge~erating capacity  in  the  Community  increased 
from  10  Gwe2  in  1973  to  52  GWe  in  1983.  This  increase occurred  mainly  in 
France  (+  24.3 GWe),  but  there  were  also significant  capacity  additions  in 
the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  (+  8.8 GWe),  the  United  Kingdom  (+  4.1  GWe) 
and  Belgium  (+  3.5  GWe)  <see  Fig.  2). 
11.  These  developments  had  a  substantial  impact  on  the  Community's  energy 
balance.  Whereas  nuclear  energy  in  1973  accounted  for  only  2%  of total 
energy  consumption,  its contribution  had  increased  to  9%  in  1983.  Together 
with  energy  conservation efforts, the development  of  North  Sea  oil  production 
and  increased  use  of  natural  gas,  nuclear  ene~gy has  helped  to  reduce  the 
Community's  dependence  on  imported oil  from  62%  in  1973  to  32%  in  1983. 
12.  This  overall  progress,  however,  masks  very  considerable differences 
between  the  Member  States  <see  Fig.  3). 
13.  Strongly determined  to promote  the  development  of  nuclear  energy, 
France  and  Belgium  have  already carried out  large-scale  restructuring of 
their  elec~ricity production systems.  In  1983,  they  produced  48%  and  46%, 
respectively,  of  their electricity from  nuclear  energy  as  compared  with  8% 
and  0.2%  in  1973. 
14.  Progress  has  also been  achieved  in  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany 
and  the  United  Kingdom,  although  the  programmes  in  those  countries  have 
suffered significant delays.  In  Germany,  the  nuclear  share of electricity 
production  increased  from  4%  in  1973  to  18%  in  1983,  while  in  the  United 
Kingdom  the  corresponding  increase  was  from  9%  to  17%. 
15.  Only  modest  increases  in  the  contribution of  nuclear  energy  have  been 
achieved  in  Italy and  the  Netherland~,  from  2.2%  of  the electricity produced 
in  1973  to 3.2%  in  1983  in the  case of  the  former  and  from  2%  in  1973  to  6% 
in 1983  in the  case  of  the  latter. 
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Four  Member  States,  namely  Denmark,  Ireland,  Greece  and  Luxembourg,  have 
not  adopted  nuclear  energy  programmes. 
16.  There  are  various  explanations  for  this disparity: 
- public  opposition of  varying  intensity to nuclear  energy; 
- relations  between  central  government  and  local  authorities,  which  could 
be  better  in  some  cases; 
-the use  of  a  fossil  source of domestic  energy  for  electricity production 
in  certain  Member  States,  particularly  the  Netherlands,  the  Federal  Republic 
of  Germany  and  the  United  Kingdom. - 9  -
(b)  The  outlook  for  1990 
17.  In  the  c6ntext  of their  jo~nt efforts to  reduce  ~he Community's 
dependence  on  oil, the  Member  States.have  agreed  that  electricity production 
should  be  based  mainly  on  solid  fuels  and  nuclear  energy  from  the  1990s  onward. 
18.  According  to  the  Member  States'  forecasts  for  1990,  the  switch  from  oil 
to  nuclear  and  solid  fuels,  already  well  under  way  in  the electricity 
production  sector,  will  continue  throughout  the  present  decade,  mainly  owing 
to  the  increase  in  nuclear  energy  production  <+  83%)  and,  to .an  appreciably 
lesser extent,  of  coal  production  (+6%)  over  the  present  Levels  <1983). 
As  a  result,  nuclear  energy  and  coal  should  be  contributing  equally  to  71% 
of  net  electricity production  in  the  Community  by  the  early  1990s.1 
19.  By  th~ end  of  1983,  there  were  95  nuclear  reactors  in  the  Community 
with  a  total  capacity of  52  GWe.  By  1990,  128  reactors  with  a  total  capacity 
df  98  GWe  should  be  in operation  in  the  Community.  Although  the  risk of 
further  delays  in the  nu~lear programmes  cannot  be  ignored,  there  is  a  good 
6hance  that  this  capacity  will  actually  be  available  by  1990,  a~ all new 
reactors  planned  for  entry  into  service  by  that  date  are  already  under 
~onstruction. 
20.  Nuclear  energy  production  should  represent  144  million  tonnes  of  oil 
equivalent  (Mtoe)  and  be  sufficient to  cover  14%  of  the  total  energy 
requirements  in  1990.  This  means  that,  within  the  Community,  nuclear  energy 
production  would  reach  the  same  Level  in  pri~ary energy  terms  as  hard  coal 
production  (144  Mtoe)  and  exceed  production  both  of  natural  gas  <114  Mtoe) 
and  of  oil  (106  Mtoe).  This  stresses still further  the  importance  of 
nuclear  power  as  an  energy  source  for  the  Community. 
1The  objective  for  the  Community  is that,  by  1990,  70-75%  of  primary 
energy  inputs  into electricity generation  should  be  provided  by  solid fuels 
and  nuclear  energy.  Measured  on  this basis,  solid fuels  and  nuclear energy 
should  account  for  81%  of etectric{ty generation  in  1990  according  to  Member 
States'  forecasts.  If this  is measured  in  relation  to net  electricity 
production,  which  is  the  point. of  comparison  of  most  interest  to  the 
electricity sector  and  that  chosen  throughout  the  illustrative programme, 
a  combined  share  of  71%  is obtained  for  nuclear energy  and  coal  for  the 
same  situation. - 10  -
21.  The  upturn  in  the  contribution of  nuclear  energy  will  occur  exclusively 
in  those  Member  States  which  already  have  a  Large-scale  nuclear  energy 
programme,  chiefly  France  (+27.6  GWe),  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany 
(+10.7  GWe)  and  the  United  Kingdom  (+4.2  GWe).  In  this decade,  the  existing 
disparities  between  the  Member  States as  regards  the  use  of  nuclear  energy 
will  continue  to  widen.  In  view  of  the  long  lead  times  involved  in  nuclear 
power-plant  programming,  it will  not  be  possible to  reverse this trend before 
1990.  This  should  be  a  primary  concern  of  Member  States  which,  at  that  time, 
will still be  largely  using oil  and  imported natural  gas  for  electricity 
production. 
22.  On  the other  hand,  by  the  end  of  this·decade,  it is  likely that  the 
nuclear  power  production  capacity  in  certain Member  States  such  as  France will 
have  increased  rapidly until it is  in excess of  what  is  needed  to meet  the 
base-load demand  for electricity up  to  which  point  the  competitive  advantage  of 
nuclear  power  is  at  its greatest.1  In  such  a  case,  it would  be  advantageous 
to broaden  the  market  for  base-load electricity supplies  in order  to  improve 
the  economics  of  nuclear electricity production. 
23.  In  this  context,  it is interesting to  note  that  certain States  share 
investments  (acquisition of  holdings  in  nuclear  power  stations>  and  share 
the electricity produced.  This  practice  is an  advantageous  variant  of 
cross-frontier electricity sales,  which,  in any  case,  should  be  encouraged 
whenever  it enables  supply  conditions  to be  improved  from  the  two  standpoints 
of  price and  security. 
1rt  should  be  noted,  however, 'that progress made  in  nuclear  plant  design  and 
operation  now  permits  nuclear  pow~r plants to  be  used  also  for  "load  followin~". 
l· - 11  -
24.  Lastly,  as  regards  the  prospects  for  nuclear electricity generating 
costs,  the  forecasts  made  by  the  Community•s  electric~ty producers,  in 
which  the  Co~mission was  also  involved,  show  that  the  cost  per  kWh  of 
nuclear electricity generated  by  planfs  to be  placed  in  service  in  1990 
is  less  than  that  of  electricity produced  with  coal  and  much  less  than  that 
of  electricity produced  with  petroleum products.  These  estimates also  show 
that  the  fuel  cost  accounts  for  less  than  one  third  (28%)  of  the total  cost 
of  the  kWh  <see  paragraphs  16  and  17 of  PINC).  The  shares  of  the  various 
.components  that  go  to  ~ak~ up  the  fuel  item  are  as  follows: 
Natural  uranium  30% 
- Conversion  2% 
- Enrichment  30% 
- Fabrication  12% 
- Reprocessing  30%* 
~ Materials  recovered 
during  repro~essing  - 4% 
N.B.  The  above  are  average  values  within  quite  large  ranges  because  the 
calculation  assumptiohs  v~ried  f~om one  producer  to  another. 
It  is  apparent  from  this  bre.kdown  that. the  ra~ material  for  n~clear fuel,· 
i.e.  natural  uranium,  accounts  for  less  than  10%  of  the  total  cosi  of  the 
kWh  (30%  X  28%  =  8.4%). 
*  The  reprocessing  item  includes,  amohg  other things; vitrification of  fi~sion 
products  and  the  conditioning,  transport,  interim storage  and  final  disposal 
of  waste. - 12  -
3.  Uranium  supplies 
25.  Uranium  is a  strategic material  subject  to  national  controls,  the 
only  significant  use  of  which  is  in electricity generation;  the  uranium 
market,  which  came  into existence  relatively  recently,  is naturally very 
sensitive to developments  in  the  field of  nuclear  energy.  Uranium  possesses 
very great  energy density  and  physical  and  chemical  characteristics  which 
make  it easy  to store.  It  is thus  possible, to store  much  greater quantities 
of  energy  than  is  the  case  with  fossil  fuels. 
26.  The  uranium  market  has  been  characterized over  the  three decades  of 
its existence  by  two  periods  of  intensive  growth  <1959  and  1978),  separated 
by  a  sharp depression  (1972) .and  followed  by  a  sudden  drop  in  prices  in 
1983-84,  which  was  accompanied  by  a  drop  in  production.  In this context, 
the  existence of  considerable  stocks of  uranium  is  such  as  to  influence 
the  market. 
27.  Supplies  to the  Community  over  the  next  decade  will  account  for  virtually 
one-third of  the  uranium  requirements  in  the  western  world,  while  those  to 
the  United  States will  account  for  a  further  third.1  The  Community  meets 
almost  all  these  requirements  by  means  of  long-term  contracts.  European 
industry  has  considerable  interests  in  the  major  uranium-producing  areas 
and,  in  the  exporting  countries,  it contributes  towards  the  production of 
quantities of  uranium  of  the  same  order  of  magnitude  as  all  the  Community's 
import  requirements.2  However,  this  should  not  be  taken  to  mean  that  the 
Community  has  unlimited  access  to these  potential  supplies,  since  the  export 
of  uranium  is  subject  to political  conditions. 
28.  The  uranium  mining  industry  is a  particularly concentrated  industry, 
with  six  countries  <USA,  Canada,  South  Africa,  Australia,  Niger  and  Namibia) 
holding  80%  of  the  reserves  that  can  be  worked  at  a  cost  of  less  than  $80/kg  U 
and  accounting  for  90%  of  world  production.  Some  50  companies  are  involved  in 
uranium  production  (most  of  them  American),  and  five  companies  (Cogema, 
France;  RTZ,  United  Kingdom;  Nufcor,  South  Africa;  Energy  Resources  of 
Australia;  and  Keylake  Mining,  Canada)  control  over  60%  of  the  world 
production  capacity. 
1Requirements  in  1990  can  be  estimated  as  17  500  t/U  for  the  Community, 
16  800  t/U  for  the  United  States  and  16  200  t/U  for  the  rest  of  the  world. 
2
It  is es:imated  that~  in  1990,  the  Community's  production  capacity,  mainly 
located  1n  France,  w1ll  be  4  000  t/U;  it will  cover  close  to  25%  of 
requirements  at  that  time,  the  remaining  supplies  (75%)  having  to  be  imported. 
'  .  ! 
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29.  Most  of  the  comme~cial transactioris  in  uranium  (about  90%,  thi~ proportion 
being greater  in the  Community)  are  conducted  under  long-term  contracts. 
"Spot"  transactions  account  for  the  remainder.  In  view  of  the existing 
'  situation,  which  is characterized  by  substantial  stocks  and  the  closure 
of  unprofitable  mines,  a  "secondary  market"  has  been  created  which  is 
slowing  down  the  recovery  of  uranium  prices.  The  drop  in  prices on  the 
••spot"  market,  although  it  may  appear  beneficial  in the  short  term  to the 
buyers,  itself gives  rise to  risks  for  the  future,  since  the  producers, 
deprived  of  financial  resources,  will  sharply  decrease  their prospecting 
expenditure.  As  regards  Long-term  contracts,  the  prices  involved  are  Less 
subject  to  sudden  change  and  the  general  trend  which  is  now.  emerging  is as 
·follows:  to  avoid,  on  the  one  hand,  ex~essive commitments  on  the  part  of 
~he buyers  which  would  result  in periods  ~f-~urpl~s  Likely  to  depress  the 
.~arket  and,  on  the  other  hand,  to enable  producer~ profits  to  be  stabilized 
in order  to  ensure  regular  supplies. 
30.  As  regards  the  conditions  governing  uranium  supplies,  it should  first 
of atl be  kept  in  mind  that  the  p~oducer and/or  tonsumer  countries  can  be 
divided  into  countries  which  are  solely  produce~s  (Australia~ Niger,  Gabon  ~ 
and  Namibia),  countries  which  are  producers  and  low-level  consumers  (Canada 
and  South  Africa),  countries  which  are  both  producers  and  consumers  (France 
and  the  USA)  and  countries  which  are  solely  consumers  <other  Community 
Member  States). 
Among  the  producing  <and  exporting)  countries,  policies  for  development 
of  the  uranium  mining  industry  may  be  widely  influenced by  concerns  relating 
to the non-proliferation of nuclear  weapons  or by  the desire  to  obt~in 
substantial  revenue  (in  the  case  of  developing  economies).  These  factors 
give  rise to  a  wide  diversity.of  supply  conditions affecting  countries 
which  import  uranjum. 
31.  Although  th~ western  wor(d•s  uranium  production  capacities  in operation, 
under  construction or  planned  at  the  end  of  19831  are  sufficient  to  cover 
requirements  up  to the middle  of  the  next  decade,  the  present  cut-back  in 
exploration  muat  not  be  treated  Lightly  in  view  of  the  considerable  time 
<about  ten  years)  required  to open  up  a  uranium  deposit  and  commence  mining 
operations. 
1world  uranium  output  in  1983  amoun~ed to. 37  200  t, and  the  world  production 
capacity_ by  1990  can  be  estimated  as  50  300  t. 32. 
- 14  -
1  The  world's  resources  of  low-cost  uranium  that  are  known  at  present 
are  capable  of  covering  the  western  world's  requirements  for  about  20  years, 
and  half of  them  are  Lotated  in .Canada,  Australia  and  South  Africa. 
However,  the  concentration of  resources  in  such  a  small  number  of  producing 
countries  and  the  cut-back  in prospecting  which  followed  the  drop  in  prices 
could,  if they  were  to  last,  run  counter  to any  policy of  diversification 
and  thus  of  security of  supply.  It  is thus  a  matter  of  concern  for  th6se 
Member  States that  are  implementing  a  nuclear  power  programme  and  are  heavily 
dependent  on  outside  sources  of  supplies. 
1rhis does  not  take  ~ccount of  the  conditions  imposed  by  certain producers 
which  are  Likely  to affect  the  price paid  by  the  consumers  <taxation, 
floor  price  ~ixed by  ihe governments,  etc.)  and  to  restrict the  use  of 
uranium. 
'1 
!  . 
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4.  The  nuclear  fu~l  industry  (fuel-cycle  services> 
32  bis.  The  fifms  within  the  C6mmunity  have  developed  an  ~ndustrial 
potential  in  respect  of  ~ll  stages of  the  fuel  cycle  downstream  of  uranium 
production,  the  latter being  mainly  carried ~out  outside  the  Community 
(see  parag~aph 27  above): 
- uranium  conversion; 
- uranium  enrichment;. 
- fuel  fabrication; 
- storage  and  reprocessing  of  irradiated fuel; 
management  and  disposal  of  radioactive wastes; 
- transport  of  nuclear materials. 
(a)  Conversion 
.33.  Conversion,  which  accounts  fo~ only  a  small  part·of the  total  fuel-eye~ 
cost  <2%>,  is nonethele~s an  essential stage  in the  c~cle and  possesses 
its own  specific  ind~strial  cha~acteristi~s  • 
·".; 
34.  Five  companies  are  currently carrying  out  conversion  operations  in  the 
weste~n world,  two  of  them  within  the  Communiti:  ~ritish Nuclear  Fuels  Ltd., 
• ..  -1 
in  the  United  Kingdom,  and  Comurhex,  1n  France.  In :1982,  the  average  rate 
of utilization of  such  installations throughout· the  wo'rld  was  about  80% • 
. ·., 
·/·. 
35.  55%  of  the  capacity  availabt~ within  ~he  Co~muni~y {s  enough  to  cover 
the  Community's  own  requ'i rements..  T:he  -rate  of-· uti l iz'ation of  the  European 
installations solely to  cover_th~ Communit~'s pw~  int~rnal  requirements 
should  increase gradually  to  75%  by  1990.  The  ~onvers~on industry  is also  .  '  .  .  .  ·.  ·:' 
..  . 
an  exporting  industry  which  meet~ .the  requi,rein:ents  o·f  European  countries 
outside  the  EEC  and  those  o:f  non..,Europ.~an _countries. 
··..:.... 
1The  European  indusfry'·_also  ca.rries:·-dut  converslc;m  of  uranium  recovered 
during.~eprocessing~ 
.·  .. 
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36.  It  may  thus  be  said that  conversion  requirements  within  the  Community 
will  be  adequately  met.  Furthermore,  the  capacities  can  be  increased  rapidly, 
if necessary,  by  expanding  existing plants. 
37.  However,  the  European  companies  in this sector will  in  future  have  to 
cope  with  keener  competition  from  certain uranium-producing  countries  which 
insist, or try to insist, ori  their uranium  being  sold  in  forms  that  have 
been  processed  beyond  the ore-concentrate stage. 
(b)  Enrichment 
38.  Uranium  enrichment  is  an  activity of  considerable economic  and  political 
importance.  This  stage  is  responsible  for  about  30%  of  the total  cost  of  the 
fuel  cycle  in  the  case of  reactors  fuelled  with  enriched  uranium,  which 
account  for  almost  the entire installed nuclear  capacity  within  the  Community. 
39.  Until  1979,  the  Community  was  almost  completely  dependent  on  outside 
suppli-ers  for  its enriched uranium.  The  United  States dominated  the  world 
market  unttl  the  USSR  entered the  commercial  scene  in the early 1970s. 
40~  This·situation has  changed  fundamentally  since  the  setting-up.of  two 
mu~tinational groups  for  eririchment  within  the ·Community:  Eurodif  and  Urenco. 
The  entry  into service  in  1979  of  the  Eurodif  plant,  the  capacity of  which 
is·10·.8 million separative  work  units  <SWU)  per  year  or  40%  of  the  Americ~m 
capacitfe~, and.the  current  phased  implementation of  the  investment  programme 
decid~d on·by  the  Urenco  gr:oup1  make  it poss-ible,· not  only  to meet  the 
Community's  requirements,  but  also to  ~os~ess capacities sufficient to export 
·this very  high-value-added service.  In  consequence,  imports  of  enriched 
uranium  have  decreased  considerably  from  the  100%  needed  to meet  requirements 
in  the  1970s  to  less  than  25%  in 1983. 
1  . 
By  1983,  these  investments  had  resulted  in  a  capacity of  about  1  million  SWU. ,.i. 
- 17  -
41.  Industrial  competiti·<;m  is extremely  tough  on  ~tl the  world  markets·owi_n.g. · 
to  the  ext~nt of  the  exigting production  capacities.  At  preserit,  it 
opposes  American  and  European  producers,  and  it is probable that  the 
Japan~se will ·joint  the  fray  within  the  next  decade.  The  present 
enrichment  service  capa~ity available on  the  ~6rld m~rket, about 
42  million  SWU/year,  will  prob'ably  continue .to  remain· in  excess of 
requirements  until  the  middle  of  the  next  decade,  when  those  requirements 
will  have  increased  from  about  25  ·million SWU/year  today  to  over 
40  million SWU/year. 
42.  Furthermore,  the  conclusion  of  major  long-term  enrichment  contracts 
with  the  USDOE1  in  the  1970s,  under  conditions  fixed  by  the  suppliers 
which  included  t~e obligation to  sign  tong-term  contracts  at  Least  eight 
yeara before first delivery,  resulted  in  the  building-up  of  substantial 
stocks  of enriched uranium  by  the  u~ers, and  this  has  Led  to  the  emergenc~ 
of  a  secondary  market.  This  market,  on  which  the electricity producers 
·sell  their excess  quantities, .is at  present. characterized by  substantial 
discounts  in  comparison  with  the  sole officially published·price  (that of 
the  American  producers>. 
43.  Research  under  way  in  the  field of  enrichment  gives  grounds  to 
believe that  new  technologies  could  make  it possible within  the  next 
decade  to  reduce  production  costs  significantly. 
'1  . 
United  States  Department  of  Energy. 
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(c)  Fuel-element  fabrication 
44.  This  stage  comprises  the  operations  which  result  in .the  production 
of  complete  fuel  elements  ready  to  be  inserted  into  reactors  and  is 
responsible  for  about  12%  of  the  cost  of  the  fuel  cycle. 
45.  In  the  case  of  light-water  reactors,  which  account  for  over  75%  of 
the  installed capacity,  fuel-element  fabrication  reached  industrial maturity 
several  years  ago. 
46.  At  present,  there  is substantial excess  capacity  in  the  Community,  and 
a  further  capacity expansion  will  not  be  necessary before  1990.  Since  the 
period  required  for  constructing  a  plant  is  Less  than  five  years,  a 
decision  to make  new  investments  in this  sector  should  not  have  to be  taken 
for  some  years  to  come. 
47.  Although  a  certain opening of  the  uranium  fuel-element  fabrication 
market  has  recently  been  discernible  in  the  Community,  the  industrial 
structures are still predominantly  national. 
48.  As  regards  meeting  internal  requirements,  the  European  market  is 
virtually self-sufficient,  and  this situation will  continue  as  Long  as 
the  European  producers  possess  sufficient  industrial  and  development 
capacity  to maintain their  hold  on  the  market  in  the  Community  Member  States. 
49.  The  industrial expertise  in  fabrication  acquired  in the  Community  should 
in  future  enable  the  manufacturers  to obtain  a  greater  share of  orders on 
markets  outside  the  Community.  However,  it can  be  seen  that  there  is also 
worldwide  excess  production  capacity  and  competition  is very  keen  on  all 
the  export  markets. 
50.  The  cladding  and  certain structural  components  of  the  LWR  fuel  element 
are  made  of  zircalloy,  a  zirconium alloy.  As  regards  production  of 
zircalloy elements,  the  plants  within  the  Community  have  been  capable  of 
meeting  requirements  so  far,  and  it is possible  to  increase  production 
capacities  rapidly  as  soon  as  it becomes  necessary  in order  to satisfy 
requirements  up  to  1990. 
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51.  The  fabrication  of  plutonium  fuel  elements  requires  special 
installations.  The  existing-plants  are  Low-capacity  plants  capable  of 
meeting  current  requirements  arising  from  the  operation  of  pilot  and 
industrial-scale demonstration  fast  breeder  reactors  and  from  plutonium 
recycling  activiti~s in  Light-water  reactors  <thermal  recycling). 
52.  The  existing plants  have  made  it possible  to  acquire  the  technical 
experience  needed  in  order  to  be  able  to  construct  Larger  units  for  the 
development  of  a  fast  breeder  programme  and  of  a  large-scale programme  for 
the  thermal  recycling  of  plutonium. 
53.  The  fabrication  of  fuel  elements  for the  family  of  high-temperature 
reactors  at  preseht  being  developed  has  reached  industrial  maturity.  The 
existing  plant  in  the  Community  possesses  a  capacity sufficient  to meet 
turrent  requirements.  The  available  technology  can  be  applied  to  plants 
with  a  greater  capacity. 
(d)  Reprocessing 
54.  Since  the  early  days  of  nuclear  energy,  reprocessing  has  been 
considered as  an  essential  stage  in  the  nuclear  fuel  cycle,  since  it 
enables  the entire energy  content  of  uranium  to be  exploited  by  su~cessive 
recycling of  the  residual  uranium,  an  operation made  possible  through 
the  use  in  fast  breeder  reactors  of  the  plutonium  generated  during 
irradiation of  the  fuel.  Moreover,  the  recycling  in  thermal  reactors  of 
the  uranium  and  plutonium  recovered  through  reprocessing  also  has 
considerable  potential,  since  it allows  uranium  consumption  and  the  use 
6f  enrichment  services  to  be  reduced. 
Lastly,  reproces~ing facilitates  fadioactive  waste  management,  since it 
enables  the  fission  products  contained  in  the  irradiated fuel  elements 
to  be  separated  and  treated  s~lectively in  accordance  with  thei~ 
specific properties. - 20  -
55.  Considerable  experience  has  been  acquired  in the  Community  with 
the  industrial-scale  reprocessing of  metal  fuel  from  natural-uranium-
fuelled  nuclear  power  stations.  This  experience derives  from  the 
reprocessing of  the  approximately  35  000  tonnes1 of  uranium  so  far 
dealt  with  in  France  and  the  United  Kingdom. 
56.  The  reprocessing  of  enriched  uranium-oxide  fuel  from  modern 
nuclear  power  stations  has  reached  a  stage at  which  it can  be  applied 
on  an  industrial scale. 
2  On  the  one  hand,  about  1  800  tonnes  of  fuel  of  this  category  from 
reactors  throughout  the  world  have  been  reprocessed  to date, 
three-quarters of  it in the  Community,  mainly  in  the  French  installations 
at  La  Hague  <920  t), in  the  German  and  British installations and 
at  Eurochemic  <see  the  following  paragraph). 
Furthermore,  the  continued  improvement  of  technical  and  economic 
performance  and  of  the safety of  the operating  installations shows 
that  reprocessing  has  now  proved  itself. 
In  the  Community,  this  sector  has  hence  been  capable  of  solving  the 
problems  arising  from  the  technical,  regulatory  and  financial  constraints 
encountered  in the  past  which  often  continue  to beset  reprocessing 
elsewhere  in  the  world. 
57.  The  experience  thus  acquired  has  enabled  the  French,  British 
and  German  ;eprocessors3  to  implement  the  following  projects  in  the 
Community: 
- two  plants with  a  capacity of  800  tonnes  per  year  each  in  France, 
namely  the  reconstruction and  expansion  of  the  existing plant  with 
a concomitant  increase  in its capacity to 800  tonnes  per  year 
(UP  2-800)  and  the  construction of  a  new  unit  of  the  same  capacity 
<UP  3), at  present  under  way  at  Cap  de  La  Hague; 
1The  quantities  involved  in  reprocessing  are assessed  as  tonnes  of 
2uranium  contained  in  the  fuel  elements. 
The  electrical energy produced  per  tOI'Yle  of enriched uranil.l'li""'xide  fuel  is about  ten 
times  as  great as  that produced  per tome of natural uraniun metal  fuel.  In  other 
words,  to produce  the same  quantity of electricity, a nuclear plant operating on  metal 
3  fuel  l-.O..Ild  ~r·ate ten times  as  ~ch spent  fuel  as .one operating 01  enriched oxide  fuel. 
l'lese  carpames are also partners  1n the  corrpany  "ltnted Reprocessors",  which  was  set 4'J 
in 1971  and had  its statute approved  in 1975  by  the Cannissi01  pursuant  to the rul.es  01 
competition set out in the  EEC  Treaty  in order to facilitate the harmonious  growth  of 
the uraniun-oxide  fuel  reprocessing  ind.Jstry. 
. ..  ;. 
- '! 
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- a  plant  with  a  capacity of  ~50 t  per year,  the  construction 6f 
which  is  scheduled  to start  in  198"5  in Germany; 
' 
a  plant  with  a  capacity of  1  200  t  per  year  <Thorpe)  which  is 
under  construcfion at  Sellafield in  th~ United  Kingdom. 
The  projects already  under  way  are  finariced  in  advance~ through 
contracts,  by  customers  on  a  pro  rata basis_ in  respect  of  the 
services to be  provided over  a  period of  ten years  of  plant 
operation.  To  these  projects  can  be  added  the  Belgian  plan  to 
modernize,  expand  and  place  in  service  again  the  Eurochemic  plant, 
which  became  the  property of  Belgium  in  1978. 
On  the  basis  of  the  start-up schedules  put  forward  for  the various 
projects, it may  be  expected-that  about  4  000  tonnes  and  12  000  tonnes 
of  oxide  fuel  will  have  been  reprocessed  in  the  Community  by  1990 
and  199~ respectively. 
58.  The  plants  now  available  within  the  Community  are  used, .on  the 
one  hand,  for  the  reprocessing of  fuel  discharged  from-nuclear 
power  stations  in  the  Community  (14  000  tonnes  ih  1990  ~nd 
25  000  tonnes  ih  1995)  and,  on  the other  hand,  for the  reprocessing 
of  fuel  from  non-Community  countries  (about  7  000  tanh~~ to be 
delivered  between  now  and  1990). 
In  view  of  the  way  in  which  reprocessi'ng  capacit.ies  have  been  expanding 
and  of  the  quantities of.'.fuel  to be  dealt  with  (those arising  in 
the  Community  and  those  from  non-Community  count-ides  to- be  reprocessed 
.  . 
·under  contract),  it may  -be  estimated that. a~out 17  dOO  to  20  000  tonnes 
of  irradiated  fuel  will  have  to be  sthred.i'n-the  e-om~IJ·~-ity  during  .. 
,·;., 
the  1990-95  period. 
Part  of  that  fuel  is already  the  subj~tt of~eb~6cessini-contracts 
and,  in  consequence,_ will  b~  repr.oce~~~d. ~f~~ir.::;299::~·  -~~s··.:regards · 
the  remainder  of  that  fue:l,  .. any  repro~essing_'_th~rebf will depend· 
..  ·  ..  '  \'.:..::  ·- :'  ..  "'  '• 
on  the  decisions  to be  ta·ken  by  the.~~:-~:~c~·,-.1·c~i;t)i:_p:"r~.0duc~rs  -~n a  c_ase"""·. 
,·  ·.  •,  ~  . 
by-case  basis.  .. 
'  ....  _  ...  __ · 
.  .  '~  - :' . 
.  .  ~ ' 
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59.  Thanks  to the  interim storage facilities,  it will  be  possible 
to store such  quantities of  fuel  in the  Community.  At  present, 
the  reprocessors  have  begun  to  construct, or are planning,  large-
scale  interim-storage capacities on  the sites of  the  reprocessing 
plants.  In addition,  many  electricity producers  have  increased 
the  storage capacities of existing spent-fuel  ponds  at operating 
power  stations, and  the  most  recent  plans  for  new  power  stations 
often  make  provision  for  storage capacities  capable of  accommodating 
fuel  discharged over  a  period of  up  to ten years  or  even  more  of 
power~station operation.  Finally, storage facilities  located on 
sites separate. from  those of  reprocessing plants or of nuclear power 
stations are already  in service or are being  constructed  in  the 
Community. 
60. ···The  cost of  the  commercial  reprocessing of oxide  fuel  accounts 
.for  about  30%.of  the  cost  of  the  fuel  cycle,  allowance  being  made 
for the  conditioning of  the  wastes  and  any  credit  from  the  recovered 
fissil~ materials. 
61.  As-~egards the. fast  breeder  reactors,  a  modern  pilot plant  for 
. .  the  repr;ocessi_ng  of_ irradiated ·fuel  from  re(lctors .of that  type  is 
und'er  construction at.  Marcoule  -(TOR>.  This  plant_  was  preceded  by 
pilot 'installatfons which,  for several  years.,  ensured  that  the 
· .Dounrayi reactor -.in  the  United  Kingdom  and  the·  Ph~ni  x  reactor  in 
Fra~.ce: could  ~p~:rate· with  a  vi rt\,Ja lly c  losed·~cycle. • 
,,  •' 
,· ... 
·, 
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--62.  All  industrial  act;i-\.d~ti·es,  including  the use  cif  nUClear·  energy;  gi:ve  . · 
rise to  resid~es,  sOm~-·9f. which  can  be  reco~ered and  recyCled,  while.  ·,_.  _:  , 
.  .  . 
others  are· considered as  ~wastes. 
:--.' 
The  radioactive  wa~tes arising_from 
:,, 
.  .  ::  ~ ::·_  .  ~  the use  of nuclear  ~ner"9Y- :are  considered  here. 
· .....  · 
\. · .. 
63.  To  facilitate understanding,  radioactive  wastes  are  here. divided ·;jn'to ·  .,·  .:-, 
•: .. 
-.two  main  categorj'es:  ..  ;._·,  ,_,·. 
.  <, 
h_igh-activHy  wastes,  arising from  the  reprocessing ·of  spent  fuel1  and 
contajr.ling  about  99%  of  the  r~dioactivity produced  duri"rig  uranium 
fissien  in  reactors; 
low- and  medium-activity  wastes,  arising during  the  Operation  of  nuclear 
. power  plants  and  6the~ fuel-cycle  installations. 
The  low- and  medium-activity  wastes  can be  further  subdivided  according 
to whether  or, not  they  contain  a ·significant quantity of  long.;.l ived 
alpha emitters. 
64.  The  processing  and  conditioning of  low- and  medium-activity  waste 
(with  the  exception  of  alpha-contaminated waste),  which  account  for 
almost  95%  of  the volume  of  the  conditioned waste  produced  today  in  the 
Community,  benefit  from  experience  acquired  over  30years.  Several 
processes  for  reducih~ the  volume  of  such  wa~te~ adapting  their 
chemical  composition  and  incorporating  them  into solid structures 
(m~trices)  are_comm~rcially ava~lable. 
65.  Certain  Community  Member·states  have  already  acquired  considerable 
experience  with  the di•posal  of  these  wastes,2  while  others  only  store 
them pending  subsequent  dispo~~l._  No  major  ~roblem ~hould be 
experienced  in this field. 
1rf irradiated fuel  is not  reprocessed,  it is considered to be  high-activity waste. 
Disposal  of such  waste  gives  rise to pnoblems  which  differ from  those  encountered 
in  the management  of high-activity waste  that has  been  reprocessed.  01ly 
limited experience with  the processing,  conditioning and  disposal  of  irradiated 
2tuel has  so far been  acq  .. dred anywhere  in the ..orld.  · 
Sub-surface  land  disposal  and  sea disposal  trdertaken in  the  cCX'ltext  of  the 
·multilateral consultation and  surveillance mechanism  estabLished  by  the  OECD. 
The  latter form  of dispo5al  is at present  the subject  of  a de  facto  moratorium. 
<N.B.:  these  wastes  ~re of  low  and  medium  activity). 
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66.  Technologies  are  available  for  the  processing  and  conditioning of 
waste  contaminated  by  long-lived  alpha  emitters  and  for  high-activity 
waste,  and  some  of  these  technologies  have  arrived at  the  industrial-
application stage. 
This  is  the  case,  for  example,  with  the vitrification of  waste 
separ.ated during  the  reprocessing of  irradiated fuel. 
67.  There  has  been  no  disposal  of  such  wastes  as  yet.  The  first 
installations for  the disposal  of  al~ha-contaminated wastes  at 
intermediate depth  in geological  formations  will  enter  into service 
in  some  Member  States at  the beginning of the 1990s.  Various  options 
for  the diposal  of  high-activity waste  are  being  studied  by  the 
Member  States and  the  Community,  particularly disposal  in  deep-lying 
continental geological  formations  such  as  salt,  ~lay and  crystalline 
rocks,  which  are sufficiently abundant  throughout  the  Community.1 . 
The  results obtained  from  research  and  experiments  in this  fi~ld 
confirm  that disposal  in these  types of  formations  is feasible. 
At  present,  waste  of this  type,  some  of  it already  conditioned,  is 
stored temporarily  in special facilities.  The  need  to allow 
high-activity waste  to  cool  down  for  periods  that  can  be  as  long 
·as several  decades  in order  to obtain optimum  conditions  for  final 
s~orage would  seem  to  rule out  the  need  for  industrial-scale 
application of  final-disposal  methods  before  the  end  of  this  century. 
68.  The  costs of  processing and  conditioning,  including,  where 
necessary,  the  cost  of  interim storage  on  the site where  the  waste 
was  prod~ced, are  known  accurately enough  and  are  accounted  for  at 
the  stages  in  the  fuel  c~cle where  they arise. 
1It should be  noted  that  certain Member  States without  nuclear  power 
programmes  are als6 interested  in this subject.  In  particular, 
D~nmark has  studied  the  feasibility of  waste  disposal  in salt  domes 




As  r~gards the  cost  of  waste  disposal,  particularly ihat  arising  from 
the disposal  of  high-actiVity  wa~te in deep-lying  geological 
formations,  the  converging  contlu~ions ~f economic  studies carried. 
out  in  several  countries  indicate that it will  not  exceed 
3%  of  the production  co•t  of  the  n~clea~  kWh~
1 
69.  IIi  accord~nce with  the  Council  ~esolution of  18  February  1~8d
2 
approving  a  plan  of  action, the  Commi~sion ·is  administ~ring, in the 
radioactive  waste  sector,  a  major  Community  programme -including, 
in  particul~r,  research  work  - which  has  been  coordinated  with  the 
activities of  the  Member  States;  it is also associated  through 
specialized·agreemelits  with  certain non•Community  countries. 
As  part  of  this  plan  of  action,  the  Commission  also  has  to analyse 
continuously  the situation in this sector.  The  first  exhaustive 
analysis of  the  present  situatioh  a~d pro•pects  was  recently 
fo~warded to the  Co~munity  inst~tutions.
3 
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1This  is not-an estimate of  the  cqst  of disposal,  but  an  upper  limit 
~hich  th~t cost  will  not  exceed under  any  ci~cumstance~; such  an 
assessment  does  not. take  account o.f  cost  di scouniing,  which  reduces 
2the relative extent.of the  costS~- · 
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(f)  The  transport  of  nuclear  fuel 
70.  The  nuclear-fuel  transport  sector  in the  Community  will  expand 
considerably  in  the  years  ahead  because  of  the  rapid  expansion of 
national  nuclear  power  programmes.  The  diversity of  products 
transported,  the  means  of  transport  used  and  the  geographical  locations 
concerned  are three essential -but not  necessarily  interdependent-
aspects  of  this. type:of transport. 
The  sector  covers  a  very  wide  range  of activities:  the  transport 
of  uranium  in all its forms Core  concentrate,  natural  and  enriched 
uranium  hexafluoride,  uranium  and  plutonium  oxide,  new  and  irradiated 
fuel  elements)  in  specific  packagings  ~dapted to  the  physical  and 
chemical  characteristics of  these materials  and  the  nature  of  the 
risks  they  represent. 
71.  The  cost  of  transporting  nuct~ar ~aterial  (ore,  processed 
uranium,  fuel,  etc.)  is  included  in that  of  the  various  services 
associated with  the  fuel  cycle and  accounts  for  a  very  small  proportion 
of  the overall  cost  of  the  full  range  of  such  services. 
By  way  of  illustration, the  unit  cost  of  transporting  irradiated 
fuel  - which  is the  most  expensive  transport  operation - amounts 
to  ~-few percent  of  the  cost  of  reprocessing. 
72.  In  view  of  the  foreseeable  trend  in  power-plant  siting,  the 
number  of  journeys  for  the  pu~pose of  transporting  new  fuel is  likely  to 
i"crease appreciably.  This.  tr~nd ts  not  so  pronounced  in the  case  of 
frradiated  fuel,  as  large-capacity transport  casks  wilL  oe  developed  -
oyer  tb~ next  few  years. 
73.  The  need  for  a  new  type  of  heavy  cask  has  recently become 
evident  in  the  Community.  The  type  concerned  is  a  dual-purpose 
cask  for  the  transport  and  extended  interim storage of  irradiated 
fuel  p.ending  reprocessing.  As  the practice oi  extended  interim 
storage becomes  more  widespread,  there .could  well  be  a  considerable· 
increase  in  ~he demand  for  casks  with  which  the  industry  se~ms capable 
of  cop·ing. - 27  -
74.  Programmes  for  the  tran~port of  i~radiated fuel discharged from 
nucleai power  stations call  for  meticulous  planning  on  the  part  of  the 
tran~porters, the electricity  prod~cer~, th•  reprocessors  ~nd the 
competent  national  authorities. 
Provi5ion  is made  for·a  reserve  transport-cask  ~apa~ity of 
approxim~tely 301 in order  to allow  fo~  ~ai~tenance  requireme~ts ~nd 
other  contingenci-es • 
.  75.  The:.scale of  such  operations  will  increase  in  future  to  keep 
·  -~  ·  abreas.-t·>:bf  ·.th~  .r.~qui rements  arising  from  the  greater  number  of  power 
stai"fons "i·n·  op~ration·  • 
··-,.  ·  .. 
··:_:  __ _ 
.  . 
·"·rtie:f~ture prospects :for  t.his  s·ector  point  to the use  of  large - and 
•. t•o  some:·ext~rit'·standa.rdized  .,..  casks,  which  wilt make  it possible to 
~.  .,  ~ 
·•  .. : pt:ovide  ::~  mote> ef-fj_c.ient  service'~ . 
.....  . .  :.,.;. ··-:  : ·-·-.'  ··-.··.  :-·'•·  - ... 
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5.  Nuclear .reactors:  design and  construction 
(a)  Reactor  types 
76.  Power  reactors  of  several  types  ~ or  concepts  - are  in operation  in 
the  Community,  since  their design depends  on  the  technological  and 
political considerations,  infrastructure, etc., specific to each  client. 
77.  The  oldest  type  is the  Magnox  <British designation)  or  UNGG  (French 
designation  meaning  natural  uranium,  gas,  graphite)  which  was  ~dopted 
in  the  United  Kingdom  and  France  and  exported  by  the  former  to  Italy and 
Japan  and  by  the  latter to  Spain  <a  single  reactor  in each  case).  This 
type of  reactor  was  designed  at  a  time  when: 
only  the  USA  had  the  capacity to provide  industrial-scale supplies of 
enriched  uranium; 
the  production  cost  of  nuclear  graphite  was  Lower  than  that  of  an 
equivalent  quantity of  heavy  water  <it  was  also possible to  use  natural 
uranium  in  heavy-water  reactors). 
At  a  later date,  in  the  United  Kingdom,  France,  Germany,  Italy and  at 
Euratom,  attempts  were  made  to  improve  the  neutron  economy  of  the  systems 
in order  to  increase  the  quantity of  energy  that  the  uranium  could yield 
by  developing  ~eavy-water reactors.  Except  in Germany,  where  it was 
developed  exclusively  for  export,  this design never  advanced  beyond  the 
prototype stage,  since  other  designs,  which  did  not  require  the  quite 
specific  and  very  considerable  investments  in  heavy-water  production,  had 
become  available  in  Europe  where  uranium-enrichment  technologies  had  been 
acquired  in the  meantfme.  The  unanimous  European  decision to abandon 
1Argentina  purchased  two  heavy-water  reactors  from  Germany  with  a  capacity 
of  319  and  692  MWe,  respectively,  while  in  Germany  itself there  was  the. 
52-MWe  prototype,  shut  down  in  May  1984.  European  industry developed  t.his 
reactor  type  up  to a  total  capacity of  1  267  MWe,  while  in  Canada,  where 
the  heavy-water  reactor  was  adopted  as  the  standard national  type, a total 
capacity of  15  499  MWe  has  been  atti'Jined. - 29  -
the  heavy-water  design  has  aroused  regret,  which  is perfectly 
understandable in  view  of  the  satisfactory performance. of  the  system. 
However,  that  decision  was  motivated  by  the  desire to  avoid  commitment  to 
overly  specialized  investments  at  a  time  when  alternatives  based  on  Less 
specific  technologies  were  available,  as  was  enriched  uranium. 
78.  The  design  of  the  British  Advanced  Gas-Cooled  Reactor  CAGR)  was  derived 
from  that  of  the  Magnox  and  was  intended  to  reduce  the  production  cost  of  the 
kWh  by  increasing: 
the  power  density,  and 
the  thermodynamic  efficiency. 
In  order  to attain that  objective,  it  was  necessary  to  make  use  of  higher 
temperatures,  which  required  that  the  cladding  be  made  of  refractory  metals 
arid  tonsequently  that  enriched  uranium  be  used  as  the  fuel.  Because  of this, 
the  neutron  economy  of  a  graphite  reactor  became  quite  comparable  to that 
of  a  light-water  reactor. 
The  AGR  reactors  developed  in  the  United  Kingdom  (and  even  in  the  USA, 
where  work  on  them  was  discontinued at  an  early  stage)  had  so  far  not  obtained 
commercial  success  on  the export  market,  since  the  cost  of  the  power  they 
produced  was  not  competitive  with  that  of  the  power  generated  by  LWRs 
Clight-water  reactors).  This  was  due  to  the  fa~t  that  the  good  neutron  economy 
achieved  by  the  use  of  graphite  was  adversely affected  by  the  cladding 
materials,  while  the  high  level  of  thermodynamic  efficiency  resulting  from 
high  temperatures  was  offset  by  the  high  construction cost.  As  regards 
the  latter aspect,  it is  regrettable  that  comparison  with  the  LWR  cannot 
take  place  under  equal  conditions  <in  other  words,  after  the  same  number  of 
reactors  have  been  placed  in  service). 
79.  The  other  European  countries  chose  light-water  reactors,  mainly  in the 
form  of  pressurized  water  reactors  CPWRs>,  since: 
enriched  uranium  had  become  available  from  several  sources;1 
they  provided  an  opportunity  to draw  on  American  experience. 
For  a  certain period,  the  PWR  had  to  compete  with  the  BWR  (boiling-water  reactor), 
but  the  Community  Member  States  later  showed  preference  for  the  former.  It  is 
possible  that  the  BWR  will  return  to  favour  as  a  result  of  the  experience 
acquired  in  the  construction  and  use  of  that  type  of  reactor. 
It  should  be  noted  that  there  is  no  reactor  concept  which  e~ables natural 
uranium  to  be  used  in  conjuncti6n  with  Light  water;  at  the  beginning  of  the 
.nuclear era,  this  was  a  serious  di~adv~ntage for  the  development  o+  Light-
water  reactors  in  Europe. - 30  -
80.  It  can  be  expected  that  new  reactor designs  that  may  be  developed  in· 
future  will  possess  one  or  more  of  the  features  Listed  below  in  increasing 
order  of  importance  and  priority: 
L
•  .  1 
suitability for  Low- and  medium-temperature  app  1cat1ons; 
suitability for  use  in  power  stations of  Lower  electrical capacity  than 
those  of  today; 
.  h  L.  .  2  suitability for  h1g  -temperature  app  1cat1ons; 
capacity to·recycle the  plutonium  produced  by  any  type of  reactor  in 
which  uranium  (natural  or  enriched)  is used,  either  in  reactors  of 
already  established design or, preferably,  in  specially designed 
reactors  (fast  breeder  reactors>; 
capacity  to utilize almost  all  the  energy  contained  in  natural  uranium, 
that  is to say,  to multiply  by  a  factor  of  about  60  the  amount  of 
energy  utilized so  far. 
However,  it is unlikely  that  the diversity of  the  features  referred  to 
above  will  give  rise to a  proliferation of  advanced  concepts,  if  for  no 
other  reason  than  that  the  Level  of  the development  costs,  known  to be 
necessary  from  the  experience  acquired  with  existing  reactor  types,  will 
be  high. 
81.  As  regards district heating,  it may  be  considered  that  such  a  development 
will  take  place  only  very  slowly  and  that  steam  for  that  purpose  will  first 
be  supplied  by  existing  power  stations,  priority being  given  to  conventional 
plants,  although  nuclear  power  stations  were  chosen  in  Switzerland.  District 
heating  could  eventually  be  based  on  specialized  reactors  that  generate  heat 
alone  <as  was  done  in  the  USSR)  or  have  a  dual  role,  generating  both  power 
and  heat. 
82.  Furthermore,  the  AGR  reactors  and  the  Magnox  reactors  could  provide 
industrial  steam  <the  uses  of  which  are  very  widespread  but  vary  from  place 
to place>,3  but  it is  improbable  that  this  highly  fragmented  potential  market 
would  be  compatible,  in  the  short  or  Long  term,  with  the  economic  dimensions 
of  today's  reactors. 
1  The  Low-temperature  applications  chiefly  concern  collective  (district)  heating 
<temperatures  below  200°C>;  medium-temperature  applications  concern  uses  of 
2 i~dustrial steam  (tem~era~ures below  570°C). 
Hlgh-temperature  appl1cat1ons  Cat  about  800°C)  require  the  use  of  permanent 
gases  (difficult to  Liquefy),  for  exa~ple, the  Liquefaction  of  coal, 
the  stimulation of  deposits  of  very  viscous  petroleum,  the  reduction of  metal 
~oxides, the  production  of  hydrogen,  etc. 
~Fast breeder  reactors  (FBRs),  which  are dealt  with  later on,  would  also  be 
suitable for  that  purpose. 
·• 
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83.  Low-power  reactors  are of  interest either  as  replacements-for 
decommissioned  conventional  or  nuclear 'units or  for  export  to  c_ountries· 
possessing  low-capacity  power  transport  grids.  Th~ problem  is neither 
., 
technical  (since the  known  concepts  were  developed  with  low-power  units) 
nor  one  of  credibility  (since the  German  industry  successfully sold  two 
PHWR  units  to  Argentina  without  first  having  placed  units of  comparable  power 
in  service  in  the  Federal  Republic),  but  an  economic  one.  It  is necessari 
to  be  certain that  the  cost  of  the  installed  kWe,  whi~h is higher  in  the. 
case of  smaller  units,  is  low  enough  for  such  units  to be  competetive; 
moreover,  the  extent  of  the  small  power-reactor  market  is  uncertain~ which 
makes  it difficult  to  access  with  accuracy  the  series effect  when  it is 
superi~posed on  the  scale  eff~ct  influencing  the  construction  cost  of  these 
units. 
84.  Where  high-temperat~re •pplications are  conc~rned, they  presuppose  the 
ihdustrial-scale development  of  a  specific design,  that of  high-temperature 
r~actors  (HTRs),  which  have  already  proved  their  worth  as  experimental 
reactors  in  the  United  Kingdom,  Germany  and  the  USA,  mainly  with  a  view 
t~ electricity generation.  All  these  reactors  ha~e the quality  required 
for  the~e types  of  technologic~l application.  In addition,  they  can  alsd- · 
clearly  be  used  for electriciti prodUction,  and  it is even  likely that,  in 
order  to  reach  the  level  of  profitability  indicated above,  this  reactor  type 
would  have  to  make  its initial penetration  into  the electricity sector  • 
.  H.owever,  it w1ll  inevitably  meet  with  competition  from  the existing  commerci·al 
types~ 
85 •.  The  cost  of  developing  and  promoting  this  reactor  type  has  so  far  prevented 
it from  being  more  widely  used,  but  the  associated  technology. is well  known 
<that  of  helium,  graphite and  carbides),  its thermodynamic  efficien~y and 
neutron  economy  are excellent and  its adaptability to  small  or  medium-sized 
units  has  been  demonstrated.  A further  advantage of the  HTRs  is their 
capacity  to utilize thorium  <more  abundarit  than  uranium,  but  not  directly 
fissile  in  a  reactor)  to produce  fissile uranium-233,  which  can  be  recovered 
as  an  energy  source  mat~rial by  reproc~ssing the  irradiated fuel  elements. 
Whatev~r the  intrinsic qualities of  high-temperature  reactors .~ay be,  it 
will  not  be  possible  to make  use  of them  in  ariy  new  projects  unless  major 
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decisions  on  that  reactor  type  are  taken  from  an  industrial  standpoint 
with  regard  to  a  possible project  and  the  way  it is to be  implemented: 
national  framework  or  European  cooperation.  In  Germany,  a  consensus  has 
been  reached  by  the potential  users,  the  research  bodies  and  the  construction 
industries,  who  may  shortly adopt  an  investment  programme  involving  both 
the  construction of  a  certain number  of  reactors  and  the  infrastructures for 
the  production,  on  an  appropriate scale,  of  graphite  and  graphite- and 
carbon-coated  uranium-oxide  particles. 
86.  As  regards  the  use  (recycling)  of  plutonium  in non-specialized  reactors, 
technical  solutions are  available  and  industrial-scale plutonium-recycling 
operations  are  now  being  conducted  by  several  electricity producers.1 
Decisions  in  this  connection  depend  on  detailed economic  assessments  which 
take  account,  in particular, of  the  following  specific  problems:  the 
handling  of  plutonium  fuel  elements;  accumulation  of  the  uranium-236 
iaotope,  which  Limits  the  re-enrichment  of  spent  uranium;  accumul~tion of 
non-fissile plutonium  isotopes,  which  limits  the  number  of  times  plutonium 
can  be  recycled;  and  the  internal  structures of  reactors  fuelled  with  enriched 
uranium  (in  which  recycling  is carried out),  which  limit  the  volume  of  the 
reactor  capable  of  accommodating  plutonium fuel. 
1It may  b• possible to achieVe  an  approximately  15%  reduction  in  the 
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87.  Finally,  fast  breeder  reactors  CFBRs)  are  capable of extracting  60 
times  as  much  energy  from  uranium  as  are  light-water  reactors,  either 
PWRs  or  BWRs,  and,  at  the  same  time,  of  recycling'plutonium,  whatever 
its  o~igin, with  greater efficiency. 
This  capability derives  from  the  fact  that  FBRs  use  depleted  uranium, 
which  is a  by-product  of  the  enrichment  of  natural  uranium,1  in 
combination  with  plutonium,  which  is  created during  the  operation of  any 
'  reactor  fuelled  with  u~anium· <natural,  enriched or  depteted)  and  is 
Later  separated  from  that  uranium  durihg  the  reprocessing of  irradiated 
fueL. 2 
88.  Community  industry  has  already  acquired  considerable  knowledge  of 
and  experience  with  FBRs,  and  this  is reflected,  in particular,  in  the  construction 
.  .  .  3" 
6f  3  prototypes  within  the  200- to  300-MWe  range  · and ·of  one  d~monstration  ~hit 
1oepleted  uranium  can  also  be  derived  from  the  reprocessing of  fuel 
from  reactors  in  which  natural  uranium  is used, ;such  as  the  Magnox  CUK), 
2UNGG  (France)· or _CANDU  (Canada)  types. 
The  FBR  is not  only  the  most  effective system  for  exploiting  the  energy 
potential of  plutonium,  it is also  the  system  which  most  reduces 
the out-of-pile plutonium  inventory  that  has  accumulated  to date.: 
(a)  it can  always  contain  much  greater  quantitie.~- of plutonium  than  a 
thermal  reactor,  even  when  it is ·used  for re·cyct:j:ng  purposes·; 
(b)  furthermore,  it is 'virtually una'tfe_cted,by -the  H;otopic  · 
composition of  the  plutonium, :which  it~consumes ,a~rilost fully 
(high  burnup).  .  :'  ·  ·-•  .:  · 
It  is also interesting _.to  note  tha.t  F.sRs  d6'  not·;:~h;eces:s·~,rily  generate 
plutonium - and  still  te·ss  breed it; ·.if  prope.r·~:Y  adj~'S:~ed,  they. are 
. capable,  while  generating· electridty,, 9f 
11bur,ni·f19"  p:l;qtonium  without 
3
producing_  any.  .  ·  . ·  ·  :  :: _ _  ·.  :  <:.:~::·  ;.:~.;:. ·  _:  · 
One  of  which· has  been  in  oper~tion fo.r  over ·lO_.y·e·ars'./  (l:ie  t'hird  being 
scheduled  to enter  irito_;:;service  shortly~  ·  · 
•  ~  '·-. /·  <  •  •  •  ~  •  • 
~-' 
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with  a  capacity of  1  200  MWe,  bringing the total  capacity  up  to  1  959  MWe.
1 
89.  Studies,  experiments  and  operating demonstrations  have  shown  that, particularly 
in  Europe,  the  FBR  concept  has  come  to the  fore  as  a  fundamental  component 
·Of  a  Long-term  nuclear strategy.  Dividing  nuclear  power  production 
between  FBRs  and  PWRs  would  give  the  strategy  under 
consid~~ation a  considerable  measure  of  flexibility  in  the  total utilization 
of  uranium  and  would  enable  the  consumption  of  that material  to be  appreciably 
reduced.  However,  this development  must  be  preceded  by  a  demonstration of 
the  economic  viability of  the  reactor  concept. 
90.  Except  in  the  case of  the  Magnox  and  UNGG  reactors,  which  were  developed 
mainly  on  the  basis  of  a  political decision,  it can  be  seen  that,  where 
real alternatives  were  available  (for  example,  heavy  water/light  water; 
graphite/Light  water;  helium/carbon-dioxide  gas;  helium/sodium),  the 
solution that  turned  out  to be  the  most  economic  one  was  always  that 
which  enabled  industry  to minimize  its specific  expenditure.  In  particular, 
H  the  technologies  required  by  the  two  most  promising  reactor  types,  the 
PWRs  and  the  FBRs,  are  consider~d in  d~tail, it is evident  that  a  plant 
designed  to produce  PWRs  which  was  subsequently  forced  to.  Lie  idle  caul~ 
manufacture other  heavy  mechanical  components  (with,  of  course,  investment 
in  excess  of  that  required  in  the  case  of  less  exacting  conventional  work). 
For  its part,  the  FBR  industry  is characterized  by  ~reater mobility, 
since,  und~r-nor~al conditions of site accesiibility, it has  to  make  use  of 
on-site  applic~tions
2 of  high-quality  stainless-steel technology  which  can 
be  us~d for  a  wide  ~ari~ty of  purposes.3  However,  it is conceivable that,  with  a 
vie~ to  imp~oving the  economic  performance  of  FBRs~ greater  use  will  be  made 
of  workshop  fabrication  in  the -development  of  that  reactor  type,  which  would 
-make  Ff!R  technology  more  conventional  to  some  extent. 
1with  modern  technolog~,  FBRs  are  cooled  by' means  of  molten  sodium  (LMFBRs)  in order 
to  ensure  that operating pressure will  be  low  and  that  there  will  be  a  truely efficient 
inherent - and  p~ssive - emergency  cooling  system~  In  the quite distant  future,  a 
gas-cooled variant  of  the  FBR  (GCFBR)  may  be  developed.  This  is one  of  the  types 
to be  considered  in  respect  of  the-technological  applications of  heat  previously 
mentioned.  The  difficulties arising from  very  high  pressure  and  temperatures  in  the 
case of  this variant  can  be  overcome  only  by  means  of  very  specific  and  exclusive 
techniques.  As  a  result,  industry  is  not  giving  much  priority  to  the  development  of 
the  GCFBR  variant,  since it wishes  to  cut  back  on  investments  that  are  too specific  and, 
in any  case,  such  development  would  follow  that  of  the  LMFBR  and  HTR  reactor  types. 
2Because  its  large  components  are  too  bulky  to  be  transported. 
3The  fact  that  the  stainles~-steel industry  makes  use  of  well-known  and  tried techniques 
explains  the  success  of  certain industries  in  their  par~icipation in  Superphenix, 
although  they  have  not  previously  had  an  opportunity  to acquire  that  technology  in 
the  FBR  field. - 35  -
(b)  General  outlook  for the  industry 
91.  The  Community's  nuclear  construction  industry  has  a  production 
capacity  which  greatly  exceeds  domestic  and  export  market 
requirements. 
92.  Although  the  nuclear  industry  is  characterized  more  by  the 
extent  of  its technical expertise,  its creative ability and  its 
capacity  for  coordination  (parameters  which  separate countries 
that  have  attained  industrial  mat~rity from  the others)  than  by  its 
investme~t in  manufacturing,  it is nevertheless  the  latter factor 
which,  on  account  of  its social  impact,  determines  the  potential 
development  of  that  industrial  sector  as  a  whole. 
93.  The  existing excess  capacity  in  the  nuclear  power-station  construction 
sector  affects  a  flexible  and  highly  ramified  industry  possessing 
wide-ranging skills that  are  very  difficult  to  acq~ire and  can  be 
put  to  use  for  other  ends.  Nuclear  component  manufacturers  are 
well  equipped  for  conventional  boi ler.,.making  and  fo·r  manufacturing 
conventional  turbines, distillation towers,  equipment  for  the 
iron  and  steel  industry,  concrete  furnaces,  heavy  or sophisticated 
equipment  for  major  earth-moving  and  civil-engineering work  and 
for  the  mining  or oil-extraction  industries,  machine  tools,  etc. 
This  flexibility  is still greater  in  the  field of  ~esign and 
industrial  architectur~since the  capital  there  is~almost entirely 
human  and  the skills extremely  comprehensive. - 36·-
94.  Furthermore,  many  non-Community  countries  wish  to  make  use  of  nuclear 
energy,  so  that  interesting export  opportunities  would  be  created. 
This  would  continue  a  Long-standing tradition of  the  European  heavy 
electrical engineering  industry  and  would  bring to fruition  the  extensive 
experience  acquired  on  the  domestic  market.  Nevertheless,  such  exports 
would  not  suffice to  absorb  the  excess  capacities of  the  nuclear 
industries  in  view  of  the  general  economic  crisis, particularly in 
countries of  the  Third  World. 
95.  The  pressure of  external  competition,  which  is already  considerable 
in traditional  markets,  will  increase  in  the  nuclear  market,  mainly 
in  countries of  the  Far  East  and  particularly  in  Japan.  In  that 
country,  operators  have  the  advantage  of  being  able to construct, 
service  and  operate nuclear  power  plants within  their own  market,  which 
is closed to  the  European  industry.  They  are  also the  favourite  partners 
of  the  Americans  in  reactor-system development  (an  example  of  such 
cooperation  is the  Westinghouse-Mitsubishi  agreement  on  the  marketing of 
1  .  2  the  APWR,  ."A"  meaning  "advanced").  For  their part, the  Americans 
possess all  the  requisite skills,  but  in  the  past  lacked  the  motivation 
which  would  have  enabled  them  to  be  more  agressive  in  exporting their 
equipment  and  are also  hindered  by  their  internal  nuclear  policy. 
96.  One  of  the  most  serious  weaknesses  of  the  European  nuclear  industry  is  the 
absence  of  a  coherent  tradition of  cooperation  between  the  major  industries 
participating in the nuclear  sector,  whereas  there are  cases  of 
fruitful  cooperation  between  partners of different  sizes. 
1And  the  agreement  between  General  Electric  and  Hitachi-Toshiba  on  the 
marketing  of  the  ABWR  (advanced  boiling-water  reactor). 
2In  addition  to  the  American  operations  in  Japan,  the  presence of  the 
Germans  (KWU),  which  is  a  European  alternative,  should  be. mentioned. 
.I 
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However,  some  examples  of  coop~ration on  advanced  technology 
projects  do  exist.  Studies  on  uranium  enrichment,  thermonuclear 
fusion  and  the  fast  breeder  reactor  sho~  th~t fuller  and  more 
balanced  cooperation  is certainly possible. 
97.  Thermonucl~ar fusion  is  deal~ with  in  paragraphs  105  and  106. 
In  the  fa~t-reactor field,  mention  should  be  made  of  the  SNR  3601 
and  Superphe·nix  reactors~ 
98.  Superphinix,  whic~ is nearing  completion at  Creys-Malville,  France, 
and  will  enter  into service  in  1985,  is  being  built  jointly by  France, 
Italy  and  the  Federal  Rep~blic of  Germany;2  it is  the  Largest 
FBR  constructed  so  far  and  is closer  to  a  standardized  industrial 
product  than  any  other fast  breeder.  It will  have  been  b~ilt with 
a  cost  overrun  and  minor  delays  that  can  be  envied  by  those 
responsible  for  many  projects  involving  Less-advanced  reactors. 
From  this it may  be  concluded  that, fortified  by  this  experience, 
the  industries will  be  able  to  improve  their  international  cooperation 
still further.  It  should  be  str~ssed in addition that  this achievement 
demonstrates  that  the  cost  estimates  for  the  fBR  ~re as  reliable 
as·  those  usually  made  for  Light-water  reactbrs  ahd  can  also  provide 
a  sound  basis for  planning. 
99.  It  can  be  seen  that  the  national  markets  for  light-water  reactors  and 
AGRs  are to  a  great  extent  walled-off.3  This  partitioning of  the 
European  market,  while  not  the  cause  of  the  current  excess  industrial 
ca~acity, is  neverthele~s holding  back  any  efforts-to-reduc~ it  • 
. This  excess  capacity  is the  result  of  the  ~xtent and  d~ration of  the 
economic  reces~ion, which  has  made  obsol~te the projections  on  the 
b~sis of  which  the  investments  were  made~ 
"Project  implemented  by  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  and  the 
Benelux  countries  and  accorded  the  status of  Joint  Untertaking 
within  the  meaning  of  the  Euratom  Treaty.  Luxembourg  has  in  the 
meantime  withdrawn  from  the  proj~ct. 
2  . 
Holdings  were  subsequently  acquired  by  Belgium  and  the  NetherlaMds. 
3In  practice,  a  national  market  is  clos~d whenever  a  country  wishes 
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100.  This  situation,  which  is  compatible  with  the  Community  Directives  on  the 
opening-up of  public  contracts  to  competitive  bidding,  is  the  result 
of  policies of  the  Member  States  most  concerned  and  cannot  change 
until  those  countries  consider  that  rationalizing the  sector at 
Community  levet  is  more  beneficial  than  conserving  jobs  which  are  not 
always  viable  and  maintaining  a  surplus  on.the  balance  of  ~ayments at  the 
cost  of  greater  internal  expenditure.  The  Community  has  already  had 
sectoral  industrial difficulties arising either from  problems  of 
excess  capacity  or  from  problems  relating to  the  opening-up of 
contracts.  With  the  assistance of  the  Community  institutions,  it 
has  been  possible to find<  solutions. 
(c)  Maintenance  of  nuclear  power  stations 
101.  In  the  short  term,  the  industry  has  found  a  susbstantial  market 
in  the  maintenance  of  nuclear  power  stations.  It  is estimated 
that  the  sum  of  almost  500  million  ECU  per  year  is budgeted  for 
maintenance  in  the  Community  alone.  Furthermore,  a  certain 
proportion of  services  is being  exported  to  the  United  States, 
mainly  because  of  the  number  of  reactors  in  ope~ation and  of  the 
compulsory  .backfitting  system  in  force  in  the  United  States. 
102.  In  Europe,  service activities are  being developed  mainly  towards 
specialized  maintenance  with  specially designed  tools,  the  use 
of  appropriate  software  and  optimization of  the  fuel  cycle,  these 
being  sectors  in  which  it  is clear that  the original designers 
are  in  an  advan~ageous situation from  a  technological  standpoint 
in  comparison  with  the  installation operators. 
., 
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(d)  Decommissioning  and  the  industry 
103.  The  dismantling of  nuclear  power  st~tions
1  must  be  considered  from 
two  standpoints: 
:its economic  im~ortance, that  is to  say,  the  ext•n~ of  the 
dismantling  market; 
the  associated  t~c~nol6g~, that· is to  say,  the  dev~lopment · 
of methods most  suitable for .the  di·fferent  materials. 
The  extent  of  the  market,  in  terms  of  the  volume  of  business, 
is at  present  equiv~Lent to  1%  of  the  construction  market.  Hence 
it does  not  provide  a  significant additional  outlet for.the 
indust.ry. 
It  would  be astonishing were  the  situatioM  otherwi~e; 
d~mol~~ton obeys  the same  Law  of  growth  as  the  construction sector,  but 
after·an  interval of  close  to  30  years.  Since  the  n~cl~ar sector is 
of  recent origin, demolition  is an  activity for  the distant  future. 
As  regards  the  technological  aspect,  small  reactors  are  more  than 
suffici~nt to  allow dismantling techniques  to be  developed.  The 
problems  of  a  qualitative nature  to which  they  give  rise are the 
same  as  those  in  the  case of  Larger  reactors,  and  their demolition 
will  provide valuable  experienc~ which  can  be  extrapolated  to  the 
subsequent  demolition of  larger  reactors  in  the  same  way  as·~he 
constructi.or.r of  smaller  reactors  provided a  basis for  the  construction 
Of  larger ones. 
104.  Despite  the scarcity of  opportunities  on  the  present  dismantling 
~arket, it is  likely that  the  construction  industry will  find  it 
sufficiently  advantageous  to  become  active  in  the field,  if only 
because  there  are  points of  similarity between  dismantling  and 
power-~tati~n maintenance.  The  former  can,  in fact,  be  regarded-
~:. 
as  the  final  phase  of  the  latter, both  activities  requiring of 
industry  the  same  skills and  the  same  precautions,  since  th~y are 
carried out  ~n the  same  environme~t. 
1The  decommissioning  of  nuclear-fuel  fabrication facilities  is  not  considered 
here,  since it has  an  even  smaller  economic  impact.  The  equipment,  in  f~ct, 
is exposed  only  to  surface  co~tamination and  not  to activation  in·dept~due 
to  the  lack  of  a  neutron  flux. 
: .  . 
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The  example  of  General  Electric  in  the Unit~dStates,  in  acting as 
main  contractor  for  the demolition  of  Shippingport  (the first 
PWR  nuclear  power  station)  is most  revealing of  this trend  on 
the  part  of  constructors  to undertake  demolition  work, 
especially because it shows  their willingness  to dismantle  reactors 
which  are not  part  of  their  range of  products. 
6.  Thermonuclear  fusion 
105.  The  Illustrative Nuclear  Programme,  although  deliberately  focused 
upon  aspects  of  the  use  of  nuclear  energy  which  are of  economic 
significance,  cannot  disregard  thermonuclear  fusion,  since it 
represents  for  mankind  a  new  energy  source  of  considerable potential 
which  could  be  inexhaustable.  However,  before  that  potential  can  be 
exploited,  appropriate  practical  means  must  be  available,  and  a 
considerable  period  will  inevitably elapse  before  they  are. 
106.- Research  conducted  to this end  is  concentrated  on  the  toroidal 
geometry  reactor,  which  has  met  with  a  Large  measure  of  approval 
in  the  scientific world.  The  Joint  European  Undertaking  JET 
(Joint  European  Torus)  is operating  the  most  advanced  model  of  this 
type,  which  was  constructed  on  time  and  within  the  budget  provided. 
The  main  importance  of  JET  derives  from  the  opportunity  it offers 
to  prepare,  with  full  knowledge  of  the facts,  the  specifications 
·for  future  research  investment  in  the field  of  fusion,  namely 
for  NET  (New  European  Torus)  with  which  it may  be  possible  to 
achieve  a  major  advance  in  fusion  technology. 